Can we build a better game?

Can we build a better game?

Disclaimer: This post is a metaphor and thought experiment intended to get us thinking as a community about how we can evolve the DAO. The underlying insights and ideas presented here are mostly not mine and are attributable to many community members who have shared thoughts, feelings and feedback on the DAOs current model and community experience during Season 1.

It’s not a perfect metaphor and doesn’t account for everything each member feels, but hopefully, it has value in igniting healthy debate to make the DAO better for everyone as a whole.

TLDR

  • Developer DAO currently feels too large, and bureaucratic, which is harming the experience for the majority of members who are here to make friends, have fun, network, learn together and build cool stuff. Without having to worry about budgets, Governance, legal, finance etc.

  • Should we redesign our $CODE rewards model to also reward folks for participation and learning, not just contribution, to help foster the primarily social experience that made the DAO great in the first place, and help achieve our mission?

  • Can we increase the utility of the $CODE to provide more value to members, by introducing staking, using it to unlock opportunities in the DAO, and/or to allocate treasury funds in a more decentralised (and fun!) way (i.e. like ENS small grants)?

  • Should we make the DAO itself smaller, disconnecting $CODE governance so directly to commercial and operational considerations, and rather use Governance to empower members to create Sub-DAOs that can more easily create value for the DAO and its ecosystem overall?

We can think of DAOs as a game.

Games have various actors. Some build the game, some play the game and some simply enjoy the game.

Before $CODE, we were playing an entirely social game. The incentives were vibes, making friends, learning together and building cool stuff, and this is what drove our shared experience and the relationships formed during this period made the DAO an amazing community.

Since the launch of $CODE and the start of Season 1, we’ve been playing a different game.

The design of this new game incentivises folks to become Builders of the game. People play this game and when they “level up” and become Builders, there are not enough resources to fairly reward them.

Whilst this has resulted in excellent progress within some initiatives, it has resulted in frustration for many Players who want to become Builders of the game, or the majority of folks were quite happy with the old Player experience of vibing, making friends, learning together and building cool stuff.

In some cases, it seems to have put barriers in the way of folks doing many of those things they previously enjoyed as Players, and what gave their DAO membership its value.

Have we designed the wrong game?

If so, what could we do about it?

Redesign our game for the Players

All members of the DAO are equal, they just have different wants, needs and goals. (Check out this awesome talk from Chandler De Kock at DevCon - The Future of Social Coordination in DAOs)

The game should be designed to serve those member “personas” and perhaps focus first on the majority of our DAO members, the Players.

Players are the folks who are mostly here to vibe, make friends, learn together and build cool stuff, without the bureaucratic restrictions that come with navigating Governance, budget proposals, accounting, legal considerations and the like.

They should be able to contribute to building the DAO itself, but it shouldn’t be the only or even the default path they can take, as it largely is now. Realistically there are only so many Builders a DAO needs or can sustain; today’s experience favours the few, not the many.

We shouldn’t be afraid of rethinking and redesigning elements of the game we’re playing. In fact, we should always be actively working to improve it.

The launch of Developer DAO was an experiment after all.

What follows are some ideas on how we might achieve this and a request for feedback, critique, discussion and many many more ideas. :slight_smile:

Reward social interactions

Developer DAO is a community. A network of like-minded folks who broadly share the same values and interests, constantly interacting with each other in different ways.

These network effects are what gave our DAO its initial value.

It made the whole greater than the sum of its parts.

So how can we redesign elements of our game to encourage and reward actions that drive these effects?

One way we could do this is by having a monthly $CODE budget for Players to allocate to each other via Coordinape circles. Folks would be able to recognise members purely for their participation, sharing dank members, asking good questions, vibing in VC5 or helping folks out with technical problems.

Whatever other members feel is valuable participation that makes for a healthy community they want to be a part of, they should be able to recognise others for providing it.

Our early contributor round had its flaws but it mostly allocated elevated Governance to broadly the right Players. How do we learn from our experience and use similar mechanisms to re-energise the social layers in the DAO?

We could also potentially achieve a similar effect by introducing tipping in the server for folks to send each other small amounts of $CODE to show personal appreciation for their contributions. Big or small.

Another path could be giving POAPs to folks who attend social events in the DAO and then allocating a pool of $CODE tokens each month as a reward for participating in the community to make it a healthier space.

We’re trialling this last idea in the Dev Guild after a successful poll between guild members to allocate $CODE to folks who attend weekly syncs.

It’s not perfect and means folks who can’t attend will be at a disadvantage, but we can tackle that together over time and this gives us an opportunity to learn. In the short term, I hope it will increase participation, help folks make friends, vibe and learn together, and build cool stuff.

Reward Learning

In $CODE we have a tool to incentivise and reward anyone for whatever we collectively feel helps us achieve the DAOs mission. As learning is a huge part of our mission, how can we use this tool to encourage folks to level up their knowledge?

One way we do achieve that is by rewarding in $CODE who verifiably complete tracks in the Academy, hold a POAP for attending a workshop or helping someone solve a problem they’re stuck with.

By rewarding folks in $CODE for learning in an open way, we could welcome into our community exactly the kind of folk who could make it a more valuable space, whilst removing the purely economic barriers to entry that are currently in place.

How else could we reward folks for learning in a Sybil-resistant way?

Allocate meaningful funds from the Treasury in a more decentralised (and fun!) way

The current process for applying for a Budget from the DAO is cumbersome, hard to navigate and comes with various expectations. As the Treasury grows over time, how can we better decentralise, simplify and make enjoyable, the allocation of funds to support members building cool stuff?

One idea is to run regular no-questions-asked grants rounds whereby we allocate a certain amount of funds from the Treasury and invite submissions from DAO members to apply for this funding to build their idea.

Rather than have strict criteria, once submissions are made, we could allow the community to vote using the $CODE rewards they get from participating and learning. ENS do this via their Small Grants Rounds where the top 10 voted-on submissions get 1 ETH to build out their public goods project. It can be anything, as long as it’s a public good.

An approach similar to this could make the allocation of funds more “bottom-up” and decentralised, as well as create space for more creativity without the restrictions of the current budget process.

Increase utility in the $CODE token (and the D4R NFT?)

Right now, the only utility the $CODE taken has is community access and Governance.

There are limited incentives for members to acquire the token and hold onto it beyond securing elevated Governance in the DAO.

This has several downsides including

  • Favours existing large bag-holders over newcomers. Without strong incentives to increase $CODE holdings, decentralisation of Governance power is likely to be far slower or even reduce over time.

  • It means the DAO is solely relying on socialware vs trustware. Defined as follows by forgmonkee, Julia Rosenberg and Chase Champan from Metropolis (formerly Orca):

  • Socialware - Mechanisms that create assurances through human relationships, incurring a high social coordination cost

  • Trustware - Mechanisms that create assurances through technology, incurring a low social coordination cost

  • It creates a market based on sell-pressure, limiting the impact $CODE grants can have on achieving Developer DAO’s mission.

Introducing more utility for $CODE should be a slow process and based on socialware first. Whilst this will present a harder coordination challenge, it will allow us to experiment together on what works, and importantly what doesn’t, before formalising any of the structures on-chain.

The good thing is we’re doing this already and folks’ observations from how our existing socialware-based game is performing are driving this conversation.

There is much thinking to do this in this space but some existing ideas include:

  • Introduce staking into our Governance mechanism, whereby to participate in Governance folks must take their $CODE tokens.

  • Provide discounted or free merch to folks who earn > X $CODE a month/season etc. Maybe we can also have unique Merch drops for OF D4R NFT holders.

  • Staking $CODE tokens to gain access to opportunity, particularly where the Foundation or any Sub-DAOs are taking on elevated risk to provide the opportunity. Staking your $CODE to be a Project Lead or Contributor in D_D Agency could be a good example of this.

I foresee two critically important considerations if we were to introduce such mechanisms over time:

  1. It must be reasonably possible to earn the required number of $CODE tokens to realise these benefits with 0 costs to a member other than time and participation.

  2. There must be Sybil resistance to limiting how much the system can be gamed by bad actors with deep pockets.

Ntindle suggested an additional consideration: should we allow members with existing $CODE holdings to stake their tokens to support someone else with less to unlock opportunities? It’s important we have a bottom-up approach to figuring out the fundamental considerations in any trustware we implement.

There have been previous discussions about introducing membership levels in the DAO, this is a related thread of thought to the conversation Erik presented in that forum post.

Empower Builders, or Players who want to become Builders, via Sub-DAOs

For the DAO to flourish, it needs folks dedicated to creating things that add value to the DAO and its ecosystem.

Currently, the DAO feels too large and, in some ways, is restricting the progress-motivated Players who want to become Builders and add value back to the DAO.

Under the current model, there are a few core roles that are well-rewarded (mine included), some rewards flowing to folks supporting those roles (i.e DevRel) and then a lot of people investing a lot of their time for no rewards beyond elevated Governance.

So what could we do about this?

Many other DAOs adopt a model where they create separate entities, or Sub-DAOs, that exist to further the DAO and its ecosystem as a whole. They are free to operate independently in terms of how they manage their day-to-day operations, yet are value-aligned and accountable to the DAO more broadly.

Exactly how the relationship between such entities works would need discussion, but see ENS Labs or Swirlds Labs from the Hedera ecosystem for examples of this happening in practice.

Such an approach could have a number of benefits for the DAO:

  • Greatly simplify Governance, removing much of the operational, financial and legal concerns of a small subset of activity from the overall DAO. With other suggestions above, this could make Governance more fun and increase participation.

  • Empower members or groups of members to more freely create value that can flow back to the DAO, without being held back by the overhead of being part of the DAO proper (e.g., easy access to financial infrastructure, potential funding that doesn’t mean selling $CODE, but can improve the DAO for everyone, partnerships with other organisations).

  • Make the Player and Builder experience much clearer and therefore fairer, with a clearer pathway for how Players can become Builders of the game if they want to (for example, Agency.)

This kind of approach to hybrid structures is not new.

Organisations with public good missions such as the Mozilla Foundation have solved them in similar ways in the past to great effect. Their Foundation has a public goods mission but spins out mission-aligned entities that can more easily take advantage of the markets to have a far bigger impact on that mission and return value to fund others.

This series of articles written by Mark Surman, Director of the Mozilla Foundation, and shared by @Colin4Ward, explain it well.

Conversations have started on what a “D_D Labs” Sub-DAO could look like.

A new entity that exists to wrap (and importantly make far easier and expand) the commercial activities that currently support and fund the DAO (partnerships, VIBES IRL, Job Board, Merch, maybe more), some of which are entirely blocked, and others made much harder by the challenges listed above.

This model could then apply to many other ideas and examples such as Agency, but also P3RKS, Eden and anything else that starts in the DAO, but would likely have a far bigger impact on the mission if they were released to take advantage of opportunities outside of the DAO, too.

Ensuring any such entities are mission and value-aligned is important so feedback from members on this idea is crucial. Seem evident though the status quo with regards to the “size” of the DAO and the existing structures are holding us back.

Known unknowns in this potential new game

As mentioned at the start, this metaphor is not perfect and definitely doesn’t account for everything or everyone. Hopefully, though, it is effective at helping us think about the DAO, its structure and its reward model from a different perspective.

Some known unknowns that come to mind:

  • What impact would such a redesign have on the current DAO structure (Guilds, Projects, Discord, etc.)?
  • What kinds of participation make sense to reward vs. not, same with learning?
  • How do we limit how much rewarding folks in $CODE for participation and learning be exploited?? (e.g., Ask everyone to complete Gitcoin Passport when joining, maybe reward them for this or PoH, have a mechanism for reporting perceived bad actors, etc.)
  • What impact would a new rewards model like this have on long-term Governance and decentralisation?
  • What impact would a new rewards model like this have on $CODE budgets?
  • How do we fairly allocate $CODE rewards between Players and Builders?
  • What would a correct relationship between a Sub-DAO and the DAO look like? (e.g., DAO owns part of it, all of it, revenue share commitment, profit share commitment, etc.) How do we ensure they support the DAOs mission?
  • Should Sub-DAOs be issued $CODE as part of their being established?

Hoping this starts an interesting conversation and we can learn from our experience so far to improve the game we’re playing, which so many people have helped create and love.

Appreciate there is a lot here. I welcome debate and feedback/critique/suggestions on every line BUT try to keep feedback focused, it would be great to know if others feel this catches the current state of affairs in the DAO well, and specifically your thoughts the TLDR:

  • Developer DAO currently feels too large, and bureaucratic, which is harming the experience for the majority of members who are here to make friends, have fun, network, learn together and build cool stuff. Without having to worry about budgets, Governance, legal, finance etc.

  • Should we redesign our $CODE rewards model to also reward folks for participation and learning, not just contribution, to help foster the primarily social experience that made the DAO great in the first place, and help achieve our mission?

  • Can we increase the utility of the $CODE to provide more value to members, by introducing staking, using it to unlock opportunities in the DAO, and/or allocating treasury funds in a more decentralised (and fun!) way (i.e. like ENS small grants)?

  • Should we make the DAO itself smaller, disconnecting $CODE governance so directly to commercial and operational considerations, and rather use Governance to empower members to create Sub-DAOs that can more easily create value for the DAO and its ecosystem overall?

4 Likes

Heads up if you’re wondering some of the backgrounds of this conversation check out this State of the Developer Thread opened by @luan that nicely summarised many of the challenges and the discussions/ideas in this post.

@kempsterrrr I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about this and have discussed it with members and potential members. I agree that we need to rethink how we fundamentally play the game.

The people I have talked to love the idea of earning your way in through the academy or someone else staking theirs on you to join.

Changing the game we all play to participation first makes excellent sense. Several engineers were interested in hanging out in the social aspect of the DAO. They said they’d potentially pick up a task now or then, but they are currently employed and happy with their jobs, but just unfilled socially from work.

Going into the unknowns:

What impact would such a redesign have on the current DAO structure (Guilds, Projects, Discord, etc.)?

One of the significant changes I would see would be combining many guilds into service-focused methods. Additionally, I would expect initiatives to share if they intend to make money for the DAO. If we change the game, that will enable paid positions from some of these things.

What kinds of participation make sense to reward vs. not, same with learning?

Lots of different delineations here. IMO should be decided on a case-by-case basis. Putting more rules around this at the beginning would make it more difficult. I’d put a few guidelines, though: if it’s external and reasonable, we should issue code to it. If it’s internal and laborious, we should pay people USDC (or whatever real money). We should issue $CODE for it if it’s internal and fun.

How do we limit how much rewarding folks in $CODE for participation and learning be exploited?? (e.g., Ask everyone to complete Gitcoin Passport when joining, maybe reward them for this or PoH, have a mechanism for reporting perceived bad actors, etc.)

I think this also needs to happen on a case-by-case basis. We could put significant effort into it or do it as required. I think the external facing issues are the most important to solve, and most of that could be handled with fancy captchas on things like the academy.

What impact would a new rewards model like this have on long-term governance and decentralization?

I have no idea, but I think it would get more $CODE to those who don’t run the DAO. It would also add more members with allocation and allow the DAO to grow into a proper professional organization. One of the natural impacts this would have is on the business model. I’ll go into the business model further below.

What impact would a new rewards model like this have on $CODE budgets?

IMO it would make them more valuable but likely wouldn’t change the allocations. If we decide that every hour of participation is worth 5 $CODE, then we could have 3x the number of participants for even the most active budgets. That aligned with the above decision to allocate real money for real work. That would free up the $CODE budget significantly. That, combined with @wolovim 's goals of simplifying governance with tools like governance multiplying NFTs for those contributing, will make this DAO run much more efficiently.

How do we fairly allocate $CODE rewards between Players and Builders?

We don’t attempt to is the simple answer. Builders and Players get rewarded the same for participation; builders get rewarded with a multiplier NFT (or something similar) that is considered in our voting model.

What would a correct relationship between a Sub-DAO and the DAO look like? (e.g., DAO owns part of it, all of it, revenue share commitment, profit share commitment, etc.) How do we ensure they support the DAOs mission?

This is one of the most complex questions to answer. I need a lawyer to answer this, but its model should be the sub-DAO allocated X $CODE to use as appropriate. Y% of profit should be assigned back to the DAO. X should vary based on the sub-DAO, and Y should be required in the charter of the sub-DAO.

Should Sub-DAOs be issued $CODE as part of their being established?

Yes. See above.

TL;DR Questions

Should we redesign our $CODE rewards model to also reward folks for participation and learning, not just contribution, to help foster the primarily social experience that made the DAO great in the first place, and help achieve our mission?

Yes absolutely. Doing it has a lot of benefits, and we should try to improve the DAO over time.

Can we increase the utility of the $CODE to provide more value to members, by introducing staking, using it to unlock opportunities in the DAO, and/or allocating treasury funds in a more decentralized (and fun!) way (i.e. like ENS small grants)?

I think this is a great idea. Getting discounts on merch is another place I would love to see this. Using ENS small grants as an example is a great start.

Should we make the DAO itself smaller, disconnecting $CODE governance so directly to commercial and operational considerations, and rather use Governance to empower members to create Sub-DAOs that can more easily create value for the DAO and its ecosystem overall?

I say yes. This is one of the essential things the DAO can do regarding the sustainability required to accomplish its mission. This is very important to the future of the DAO.

1 Like

After reading this I am thinking about the governance process, is it actually fair governance?
Shouldn’t there be an accountability for the governance?
We can design all the games we want but it’s not gonna go anywhere without a process of accountability and structure being on place.

Recently I came across this ElasticDAO on Kernel and I believe they have governance ideas that are worth checking out.

1 Like

I would like to discuss a couple of ideas here that could potentially solve the problem and make the DeveloperDAO experience for members more productive and fruitful.

This is specifically with regards to:

Empower Builders, or Players who want to become Builders, via Sub-DAOs

I am sharing this completely from the perspective of a Junior developer who joined the DeveloperDAO platform to build a career in Web3 and build amazing projects (basically myself):

The current on-boarding process

  • You buy NFT or Code tokens to become a part of DeveloperDAO.
  • There will be an on-boarding call where you will introduce yourself and get to know the basics about how DeveloperDAO works. (This was a great experience).
  • Based on your skills, experience you join a relevant Guild.

From that point on-wards, you are pretty much lost.

In my experience, what I did was browse a few guilds, checked the calendar for events (which was kind of overwhelming), started discussions with a few members about the different projects, even posted an idea for a potential project.

But there is not clear direction here. What I want is to take my existing frontend knowledge and my Solidity bootcamp experience to join a full-time Web3 junior role where I can kick-off my career as a Web3 developer.

THE IDEA

So here’s my idea that could simplify the on-boarding process, make it meaningful for new developers and enable them to get full-time roles where they can own their work and get rewarded:

In addition to current Guilds, there needs to be a new Guild structure based on Skill-set.
For example,
There should be a guild for “Frontend” (with a standard tech stack like React,js, Tailwind CSS, GraphQL)
One for “Backend” (Node.js, Express, MongoDB)
One for Smart Contracts Development (Solidity, Rust)
One for DevOps

In those guilds there should be a complete road map and a list of tasks that take your skills to beginner to advanced level) with a points system.

When a participant complete all tasks and proves that he / she is competent enough to participate in real world projects, they get placed in projects / job roles.

This mechanism will not only keep the members engaged but also enable DeveloperDAO to initiate and build great projects in the Web3 space.

Another approach would be to offer equity in projects based on the contributions by the team members. This will not only encourage developers to own their work but also reward them when the project becomes successful.

4 Likes

It’s time to play the game. [Insert Triple H]

Social DAOs aren’t necessarily meant to be well-funded businesses. However, to function in the long term, there are issues that we need to tackle. We need to separate the DAO from the developer. Elevate the experience for developers/builders/creators within the DAO whilst allowing the operational side of Developer_DAO to move forward.

Simply put, we need to break the DAO down to enhance efficiency and productivity in a manner that empowers individuals without stripping away voices. Service providers/ Sub-DAOs are a great way to empower individuals to act on behalf of the Developer_DAO

By minimizing governance and introducing Sub-DAOs, we can help reduce friction whilst creating new pathways for developers to get involved.

Many Developer_DAO members (including myself) contributed to Developer_DAO and received job offers from protocols or companies. However, not everyone who plays the game will be as fortunate, and we need create pathways for people to continue their journey in D_D by joining certain Sub-DAOs that can employ them to provide external services.

A good example is D_D Labs and D_D Agency, but there are endless chances for Developer_DAO members to create Sub-DAOs.

$Code

$Code is a tricky one, since there are a lot of factors that go into making a token valuable. There are various ways for $CODE to be integrated into the ecosystem that elevate its value.

  • Empower Sub-DAOs to handle responsibilities and bring revenue for D_D
  • Grants for builders
  • Lock tokens to get access to certain positions with a slashing mechanism (skin in the game)
  • Access to the DAO
  • Access to premium part of D_D newsletter
  • Access to Vibes_IRL

Players need to know what they can do with their “in-game currency” and what makes it valuable enough for them to retain it. Why keep $CODE? What privileges does it give me?

1 Like

Developer DAO currently feels too large, and bureaucratic, which is harming the experience for the majority of members who are here to make friends, have fun, network, learn together and build cool stuff. Without having to worry about budgets, Governance, legal, finance etc.

Can you give examples of the harm here and where it is showing up? That will be helpful to connect how the suggestions directly solve the problem.

1 Like

Great question. A few examples below:

  • Members want to start a project in the DAO but don’t want to do the budget process, they just want to build things with their friends and the DAO to be a good/enjoyable place to do that.
  • Members want to get involved in the DAO and help build it but the resources are not there to fairly reward them. This has happened multiple times on events and is happening in DevRel IMHO, we lose great people as a result.
  • we have various teams planning/budgeting independently but working together to bring in value, makes it very challenging to allocate funds fairly and budget/plan effectively.
  • Members want to do something that might add loads of value to the DAO but going from idea to execution is confusing/long-winded and often blocked by others/process problems (finance, access to tools/accounts) that can’t be made open/fast in such a large/complex org.
  • no one is really clear what the expectations are of projects spinning out of the DAO (i.e. perks and Eden), most quickly move out of the DAO logistically as it’s too much overhead to continue operating physically in the DAO
1 Like

Thanks for the detail on this!

One of the significant changes I would see would be combining many guilds into service-focused methods. Additionally, I would expect initiatives to share if they intend to make money for the DAO. If we change the game, that will enable paid positions from some of these things.

I’m unsure if the guild model still works tbh. their primary value is social, typically they don’t collectively create value, groups of folks in them do. having a social space for folks with shared kills and interests makes sense but guilds don’t seem to be based on observations. think empowering groups to spin things up that benefit the DAO independent of the DAO/it’s experience would be better.

Lots of different delineations here. IMO should be decided on a case-by-case basis.
think we can experiment here using social mechanisms like POAPs for attending workshops/social events. assume by case-by-case basis you don’t individual folks?

if it’s external and reasonable, we should issue code to it. If it’s internal and laborious, we should pay people USDC (or whatever real money). We should issue $CODE for it if it’s internal and fun.

Like this framing, definitely agree for folks “building the DAO” rather than just participating $CODE alone can’t work. imagine these changes will reduce the opportunity to build the DAO in the short-term but mean people are more meaningfully rewarded. particularly if we empower folks to spin things out.

would like to see us do crypto-native things if we can! also helps folks learn about the benefits of these various tools. Hopefully D_D Code of Conduct and moderation process - Seeking Input can help with bad cases too.

This is a super important benefit of this to me. more folks with more $CODE to decentralise and influence governance.

More and more I’m thinking we leave this pretty open and see what we get back, could have some novel ideas of value return. the disadvantage is the legal implications of their actions and needing folks with Governance power to get involved in conversations.

Me to :people_hugging:

super good question. not entirely sure how to answer but what’s important is:

  • things decentralise over time, as quickly as is safe (whatever that means!)
  • folks can earn meaningful governance quickly if they’re contributing a lot
  • folks are not at a significant disadvantage simply as they have less money to “buy” governance
  • the governance systems itself hold folks accountable in a fair and transparent way

think we can improve on all these points. some of the ideas above i feel achieve them to some degree, accountability for sub-daos need’s to be worked out but more generally in the DAO hopefully adopting the final version of D_D Code of Conduct and moderation process - Seeking Input wil help to :slight_smile:

haven’t had time to read the article but made a TODO for tomorrow/Monday :slight_smile:

Do you have any ideas on this?

1 Like

Really like these ideas as something to work towards. think the vision isn’t far off the academy and then the agency or partners looking to hire would use the points/badges/NFTs they earn as signals to speak to/hire.

love the idea of folks being able to trade their time/contribution for participation in the upside of projects, rather than just being paid a wage for it. this is part of the plans for [Draft] D_Agency proposal

1 Like

Super aligned here :slight_smile:

completely agree with this. if we get smaller and make creating sub-daos far more natural, hope and suspect we’d unblock and unlock a lot of creativity and value creation for the DAO/it’s members/ecosystem. right now people are just to blocked by too much on-going process/governance imho :frowning: (I’m largely responsible for much of it)

think everyone would love to see this

like the idea of slashing and skin in the game for access to opportunity, particular where other people/entities are taking on risk to provide the opportunity.

Interesting!

The big question.

@meowy working on an update to the DDIP process here.

Added this clause regarding conflicts of interest:

Conflicts of interest
Members and Stewards are expected to abstain from votes that directly benefit themselves (i.e. Voting to pass a budget request that rewards them). Such violations will render votes invalid unless corrected before the Snapshot vote ends.

Any Governor/Steward can raise a claim of conflict during the DDIP process if they feel one has been overlooked.

1 Like

I kinda have some ideas that I wanna explore which is similar to the ElasticDAO, when you check it out lemme know. I will share some thoughts with you then.

But more importantly, I wanna explore the “accountability” part.
Every responsibility should have a weight for folks to carry.
We won’t go anywhere if we are just trying to please everyone and not putting things into motion.

3 Likes

Lemme go check it out, I will see if I have any thoughts to add.

I see the new game for new learners as follows.

You earn your way into the dao through the academy (for free)

When you earn your way into the dao, you get access to the mentorship program, where you get paired with a mentor.

Once you’ve been with your mentor for a set period, they can stake their reputation on you joining the agency.

Once you are at the agency, you get paid for professional working experience. The joining of the agency would require you staking x amount of code in this case but would allow the DAO to have people stake their reputations on people they trust and put their money where their mouth is.

There are a lot of details to be worked out (and who can skip what steps), but I think this could open up the dao to new developers in a healthier way. Sometimes it’s beneficial to align particular different funnels for different groups.

I think this is what changing the game could mean overall. Not just how we make money but also how we make developers.

In this process, we play a very meta role in deciding the future of those around us.

I caution all of us to remember that

perfection is the enemy of progress - Winston Churchill

No matter what path we take, I encourage us to consider the funnels it will push people through and how it will be funded. The proposed above is not a social funnel. It’s not to make friends, but with that in mind, we can still do both for those who want to play the game with $ and not friends.

2 Likes

Check what I proposed. See if you like that

Would love to hear your thoughts on this.

A proposal reaches quorum when at least 50% of eligible EGT has voted. and passes when at least 60% of the votes are "Yes ". Proposals which pass are executed by the multisig.

Not sure about this. Would worry that people don’t contribute in a meaningful way and do the research required of them to make a good decision. I guess there’s no perfect mechanism and being required to vote or getting slashed has been something I’ve discussed with a lot of people regarding voting mechanisms for populations in general.

Have read this now mate, some really interesting ideas. Try to summarise:

  • minimise the impact of those with large holding by setting a cap on votes at a defined level

Broadly speaking my views are limiting the governance power of large holders is a good thing, their take on it is novel by setting a hard cap on voting power. struggling to reason about this a little (probably as tried), not clear to me that the benefits of this vs say a reducing curve of voting power proportional to token holdings. be super interesting to hear others’ better take on this for you and others

  • as the circulating supply of tokens increases, rebasing increases the maximum vote proportionally

obv connected to above. together they’re quite interesting in that they reward consistent contributors but don’t “price out” newer folks. that said, over time when the cap is super high I wonder if it would “price out” newer folks more than say a reducing curve of the voting power. we need data models!!! cc @BluePanda @impactbilli.eth you’ve been creating some of these :eyes: also cc @Wikist

  • Reward folks for voting 5%
  • Penalise folks for not-voting 10%

interesting mechanism to get folks participating in Governance, sounds like they’re minting the rewards and burning the penalised tokens, can’t double check as their site and docs seem to be down.

definitely gamifies governance in a novel way. we have some struggles already regarding retaining folks’ contribution and interest, two sides to this whereby punishing people purely as they don’t have the time but rewarding people for contributing, interesting balance.

1 Like

This vision is interesting and my thinking is aligned in many ways.

do you see this as the path or a path?

one thing that feels important to me is making the game more fluid and allowing members to play it in different ways, so think we should remove any strict dependencies between one level/path and another. this is happening already with some people playing the game and other just hanging out vibing, or choosing a particular level of the game to focus on.

I THINK one shouldn’t have to do x to do y, beyond maybe holding or being staked a certain number of tokens.

at the highest of high levels, I could see the funnel as something like:

Learn
Build
Ship

I wonder if each level should be able to be played in different ways. For “Learn” maybe it’s via academy, workshops or mentorship. For “Build”, it could be Agency, joining an existing project, getting a job with a partner or ENS-style grants rounds, internal grants from partners (like an ongoing/regular hackathon) and for “Ship” maybe it’s joining an internal incubator where what you build returns some value back to the DAO.

one core theme for a better game that feels sensible is $CODE is rewarded for playing the game and then used to allocate the DAOs hard treasury resources (USDC, ETH etc.) to empower people to create more value independent of DAO governance that flows back to the DAO (either as social capital or financial capital).

Even writing this out though it’s introducing a dependency between Agency and the DAO that might limit its ability to create value by tying access to $CODE for good/bad.

I wonder how important it is for each individual part of this game to be sustainable in its own right, post-allocation of initial funding from the DAO, and be free to operate largely independently of DAO Governance. We’re taking a bet on trusting them with the resources they’re being allocated to further the mission. Maybe there are certain cases whereby the DAO consistently funds them over time assuming they deliver on the value they promised.

1 Like