A proposal reaches quorum when at least 50% of eligible EGT has voted. and passes when at least 60% of the votes are "Yes ". Proposals which pass are executed by the multisig.
Not sure about this. Would worry that people donât contribute in a meaningful way and do the research required of them to make a good decision. I guess thereâs no perfect mechanism and being required to vote or getting slashed has been something Iâve discussed with a lot of people regarding voting mechanisms for populations in general.
Have read this now mate, some really interesting ideas. Try to summarise:
minimise the impact of those with large holding by setting a cap on votes at a defined level
Broadly speaking my views are limiting the governance power of large holders is a good thing, their take on it is novel by setting a hard cap on voting power. struggling to reason about this a little (probably as tried), not clear to me that the benefits of this vs say a reducing curve of voting power proportional to token holdings. be super interesting to hear othersâ better take on this for you and others
as the circulating supply of tokens increases, rebasing increases the maximum vote proportionally
obv connected to above. together theyâre quite interesting in that they reward consistent contributors but donât âprice outâ newer folks. that said, over time when the cap is super high I wonder if it would âprice outâ newer folks more than say a reducing curve of the voting power. we need data models!!! cc @BluePanda@impactbilli.eth youâve been creating some of these also cc @Wikist
Reward folks for voting 5%
Penalise folks for not-voting 10%
interesting mechanism to get folks participating in Governance, sounds like theyâre minting the rewards and burning the penalised tokens, canât double check as their site and docs seem to be down.
definitely gamifies governance in a novel way. we have some struggles already regarding retaining folksâ contribution and interest, two sides to this whereby punishing people purely as they donât have the time but rewarding people for contributing, interesting balance.
This vision is interesting and my thinking is aligned in many ways.
do you see this as the path or a path?
one thing that feels important to me is making the game more fluid and allowing members to play it in different ways, so think we should remove any strict dependencies between one level/path and another. this is happening already with some people playing the game and other just hanging out vibing, or choosing a particular level of the game to focus on.
I THINK one shouldnât have to do x to do y, beyond maybe holding or being staked a certain number of tokens.
at the highest of high levels, I could see the funnel as something like:
Learn
Build
Ship
I wonder if each level should be able to be played in different ways. For âLearnâ maybe itâs via academy, workshops or mentorship. For âBuildâ, it could be Agency, joining an existing project, getting a job with a partner or ENS-style grants rounds, internal grants from partners (like an ongoing/regular hackathon) and for âShipâ maybe itâs joining an internal incubator where what you build returns some value back to the DAO.
one core theme for a better game that feels sensible is $CODE is rewarded for playing the game and then used to allocate the DAOs hard treasury resources (USDC, ETH etc.) to empower people to create more value independent of DAO governance that flows back to the DAO (either as social capital or financial capital).
Even writing this out though itâs introducing a dependency between Agency and the DAO that might limit its ability to create value by tying access to $CODE for good/bad.
I wonder how important it is for each individual part of this game to be sustainable in its own right, post-allocation of initial funding from the DAO, and be free to operate largely independently of DAO Governance. Weâre taking a bet on trusting them with the resources theyâre being allocated to further the mission. Maybe there are certain cases whereby the DAO consistently funds them over time assuming they deliver on the value they promised.
I fully support minimizing the power of large token holders. Setting a hard cap sounds like another extreme though. Something like an inverse quadratic function would work best IMO.
Yes. I wouldnât say bureaucratic, but indeed, large organizations have a tendency to slow down and become inefficient.
I voted against it, but I think there are solid points that support that. I agree with pursuing the outcome: fostering the social experience. Would be great if we can define this as an experiment though (what are the starting conditions, what we change, what is expected outcome).
IDK No strong opinion on that.
Totally behind this, this is actually long overdue. What is necessary though is to define a success criteria for pods that are going to receive funding. In a sense of âyou are doing xyz to support our mission, for this amount of tokensâ. It would be also great if we can move this function to trustware layer, not sure if there is a good tooling for that though.
Bankless DAO is talking about moving away from this model, because itâs becoming a popularity contest, and also because it is hard for DAO members to keep up with the admin of monthly Coordinape rounds (light lift to be sure, but when you have 278 discord notifications every dayâŚ)
I think that all four of the bullets in the tldr represent a logical evolution of D_D based on what has been learned over the past year, and especially since the launch of the $CODE token.
Something I think could be far simpler (obviously a lot of detail needs defining, has been chatting a lot in the DMs with folks, in particular @Bobbay, who has helped design systems in several other DAOs such as balancer. We both quite like Gitcoinâs Governance framework as a model to clarify things far better.
Trialling this in the dev guild with POAPs, and $CODE, which is definitely increasing participation and connections but time will tell. fully support smaller experiments where we can do them.
This is essentially how I see the current contributor pathway:
My thoughts are $CODE rewards (far higher than currently) for the overwhelming majority of people who play the game; attending workshops, completing learning, write blogs, present to DevnTell etc. Earning $CODE passed certain levels gives them access to small grants rounds, DevRel incubator etc. to realise more value than just learning, gamify the system and add utility to the token.
Then we set a much higher bar for folks that want to create Sub-DAOs / Service Providers / Workstreams that legally live outside of the DAP and have SLAs, but these must all be independently sustainable as we donât have the finances to sustain them otherwise. i.e. theyâre delegated privilege to provide a service the DAO that includes using the DAO to generate revenue and they pass X of that back to the DAO.
They should be free to organise their work in the best way they see fit (i.e probs not in D_D discord) to deliver on their SLAs with The DAO experience/funnel that supports that contributor pathway, including potentially ending guilds
I was on call with Rachel Rose from Opolis yesterday and what she shared as an elevator pitch sounds very much like your last two paragraphs. Could it be perhaps interesting to get in touch and gather some experiences? They are not running on pods though IMO, it was a really brief introduction - I am writing this just because the endgame sounds similar.
Always interested in jamming with folks struggling to parse the synergy based on my admittedly very limited knowledge of Opolis but theyâre great people doing great things so love to exchange ideas/notes! Shoot me a DM if you want to set something up.
Hey guys, interesting discussion! I hope you figure out a way that uses gamification but is not abused.
I am doing research on âthe advantages and disadvantages of DAOs compared to traditional companiesâ. The research is part of my Masterâs thesis and the paper might get published. The aim is to help DAOs make better design choices. Additionally, it should help traditional companies understand if and which part of their business processes they might want to move on-chain.
It seems like you guys are struggling a bit with organizational design. I would be very interested in your first-hand experience of what it is like to be part of a DAO including the bright sides but also the problems you face.
Is there someone in your organization willing to help with my scientific research by giving a short interview (max. 30-min) in December sharing their experience with DeveloperDAO? I think it could be mutually beneficial.
You can reach me via: m.f.liebschner@student.rug.nl
Yes, we definitely should. Iâm meeting with the founders of Otterspace and Rep3 this week, regarding potentially utilizing badges as part of a redesign of the member UX.
If I like what I see, then Iâll move forward with building this out. If implemented well, it can add greater meaning to what has so far been a linear member UX, as well as one-sided/monolithic (the belief that everyone wants to be a âcontributorâ).
Badges can potentially help to make the member UX layered and thus, more valuable. Some great experimentation can happen. To quote something I mentioned to @wolovim during the early hours, regarding the Events initiative Iâve undertaken (I was mentioning how the existence of DD Labs enables us to operate in ways we previously werenât able to):
I went on to talk about monetization stuff, but all in all: Iâm 100% pro re-designing the existing $CODE reward model to better fit into a non-contributor context.
I know weâve largely discussed this in the context of Agency, but Iâm pro the idea being applied across the broader DAO.
Agreed. Non-contributors should come first. Prioritize the majority, for sure.
Re-defining the governance aspect of the DAO will be critical. When the $CODE token launched, I found myself navigating enquiries into whether people should obtain $CODE, or a Genesis NFT off secondary. And it forced me to learn how to properly contextualize what they offer, relative to governance. Reframing governance and being able to properly (and succinctly) communicate that, will be an important part of helping to increase voter turnout.
People want to vote on shit that is meaningful to them. The bulk of DAO members do not actually give a fuck about what is happening at the Operational layer, so far there is no misconduct.
Drawback to this approach is that it relies on others to have an accurate and fair appraisal of someoneâs participation. I know Iâve raised this previously, but this is heavily flawed. Itâs something Iâve critiqued in my job, too. Itâs largely arbitrary. And given that web3 (and subsequently DAOâs) are a microcosm, we need to be mindful about not creating structures or processes that are not equitable.
Also, this DAO is very siloed and has shown to be cliquish at times. Itâs something Iâve publicly called out for the better part of ~6 months. Iâve also spoken with the Onboarding team about the importance of ensuring all new members feel welcomed, irrespective of whether or not they work at a prominent web3 company/org. I just think that we already exhibit behaviours that leave me questioning whether this can work well enough.
Happy to be challenged on the above points.
Much better approach. Particularly because itâll happen in the moment. Maybe each DAO member gets allocated a certain amount. And rather than retroactively trying to recollect who participated, tips happen in the moment and then get paid out at intervals?
The Town Hall team had planned to gift some $CODE tokens to members who held all 4 of our S1 POAPâs. Just as a one-off treat for turning up and engaging.
I might still go ahead with this, based on those who hold all 3 POAPâs Iâll give it some further rumination.
In any case, as mentioned in my comment above (see: Link) - Iâm meeting with Rep3 and Otterspace later this week. Will follow up after my meetings.
Agreed.
Happy that this idea is being re-visited. Iâm 100% in support. Itâs something weâd previously discussed, when we were trying to map out a âPublic Goods Guildâ.
My proposal is that we abolish Guilds. Rebrand the ones which need to remain as âPodsâ (i.e. workgroups), and move them into an entirely new server. I created a new server last night btw. Will begin building it out, as this conversation develops.
Voting should. But this shouldnât be directly communicated. I fear it can influence people into voting, who may have otherwise abstained. Retroactively rewarding voters who selected YES or NO, feels good to me (in theory).
Fairly certain Gitcoin open-sourced their Passport offering. I like the idea of adapting something within a D_D context. But itâs not mandatory. Just a thought.
This will likely remain an unknown until we actually implement some shit.
Can you elaborate on this question, please?
My proposal is that some SubDAOâs will likely be enveloped into the DAO itself. DevDao Women is a textbook example, and thus makes sense to be wholly owned by the DAO â even though itâs led by @meowy. However, some other SubDAOâs should be majority-owned by the people who founded it. This touches on some of the discussions we had in the Steering Committee (cc: @Wikist@chuck25@Colin4ward@Erik_Knobl@myz1237.eth), but I think that based on my own interpretation of SubDAOâs (see the excerpt above); Developer DAO should have a sensible ownership stake.
If a SubDAO exists (at least in part) to feed into the DAO member experience, and weâre providing access to Developer DAO members, then that constitutes a partnership. And equity should be discussed as such.
No, not by default. There needs to be a sensible case for it.
Mate, I aged 3 years between when I started reading and when I finally finished.
Jokes aside, this was very well structured, and I appreciate the time it took to put this together.
also cc 
No strong opinion on that.
but will email now
