[Draft] Amendments to DAO Governance Structure

Definitely hear @luan points here and understand where they’re coming from. Right now tangible/quantifiable value from the DAO isn’t totally clear, but I echo @wolovim’s points about the less quantifiable value being provided I suspect has made Agency possible for the folks who have put in the hard work creating it (i.e. one wouldn’t exist without the other)

Also worth noting Agency received 54,400 $CODE in Season 1, which at its current price (ignoring the issues around liquidity) is 54,400 * $0.145 = $7,888. I also spoke with @Erik_Knobl on Friday about how the agency budget for S2 had slipped the cracks, which the @stewards will queue this week. That is another 46,600, which at the same prize = $6,757

In total, that’s 101,000 $CODE which s %1 of the total supply and at the current price equals $14,645 USD.

To the point about liquidity, I’d like to propose an extended vision on how we can address the lack of liquidity in the $CODE token and its value.

  1. Members allocate $CODE from the treasury to support Sub-DAOs which are self-sustaining (maybe mins some set-up costs and core operations i.e. accounting etc.)
  2. Sub-DAOs that generate a return give a % of that return back to the treasury
  3. The treasury uses a % of those funds to buy $CODE back from the open market to generate a demand for the Token.
  4. Members can choose to hold or sell the token in the market the DAO has now created

This visual may illustrate this better…

This model is very common amongst DAOs and could address many of the issues raised in this thread thus far regarding no value or liquidity in $CODE and, thus no value in it being issued as budgets beyond governance.

Whilst also situations are nuanced, without some minimum expectations on value return for the DAO I have observed and predict we’ll continue to see the following issues:

  1. Proposals get stuck as it’s not clear what the decision framework is for yes/no (i.e. who is negotiating the baseline value return, the stewards? everyone?)
  2. Fewer proposals are made due to uncertainty. Therefore, fewer opportunities to grow the DAOs’ and Member’s impact and put them on the table for Members to consider.

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Returning value back to the DAO also allows us to grow the resources from which we can invest in other Members with other ideas beyond the Sub-DAOs we currently have in place. It is my view more nodes in the network of value created by the DAO will always trump the sizes of a few early nodes and the DAO needs a way to grow its resources to support more nodes to be established.

An important question in this for me is “What can be a Sub-DAO?” - should we as a DAO accept proposals for any ideas or rather should we place some restrictions on what can be proposed?

I’d be very interested to hear some viewpoints on this…

NB - we need to re-clarify we’re legally OK to do this but I believe we are.