I definitely think it should be a process open to the community. DDIP process seems appropriate.
Yes, but I would expect the process to be owned by the Budget Stewards, and interested persons to nominate in a specific channel/thread. Otherwise, if 10 persons nominate themselves for each position, we would have a massive amount of threads, and forum posts.
I think there should be an option for co-guild leads, especially for Dev & Community guild can be a lot of work (main ones Iâm experienced in). Both would share the responsibility & work together on toward goals. This would reduce burnout, sustain mental health, and I hypothesize, get better results. Both would evenly split the monthly salary.
Sounds like a great option for Budget Stewards to explore. Processes like this require new ideas, and iterations to improve.
Possible caveats: Two perfect candidates may not work well together. Perhaps we define obligations for each one? Or allow teams of 2 persons to nominate themselves too?
Another impact of this option is that can become a compromise choice for Budget Stewards to try to get as many people in a role, instead of making a firm decision. I donât think that would happen now, but a possibility to contemplate in the future.
Please link the DIP for the Budget Steward role or adjust title to also legitimize that criteria.
(It might be just me, but I donât remember contributor rewards to have associated role allocation.)
Edit: I agree with it, itâs fair and opportune given the current state.
This is exactly what I was thinking. They would nominate themselves jointly, preferably already having an idea of how they would share responsibilities.
I would not really recommend putting two people together by force if you will. If two members would like to do it together with a clear understanding of responsibilities, they can be nominated as a pair for co-guild leads.
Great job! A few questions and suggestions.
Community guild lead:
Would add â& KPI for measuring itâs successâ to it, as weâll need some measure to use in order explore how to further improve the process.
What do we count as an onboarded member? Should they be constantly contributing, should they be active, should just go through the onboarding process?
MBD guild lead:
Feel like I misunderstood something, shouldnât requests for funding go to treasury guild? Would be grateful for clarification on what was meant here.
Design and product guild lead:
Currently the product project doesnât really function. Do we want the guild lead to âwake it up from the deadâ? If not, then should it be in the title?
General:
What were the considerations for the rewards sums? The fluctuate between each guild leader but it is not specified why.
Thanks again for the great job and the very clear and thorough proposal!
Please link the DIP for the Budget Steward role or adjust title to also legitimize that criteria.
This concept is taken from this proposal:
This is the specific part:
Gain support of a Budget Steward: for S1, a Budget Stewards Committee is being created. The committeeâs first members are the guild leaders and the top 5 verified members from our early contributor rewards round, chosen by DAO members. A Budget Steward role will be created on discord and discourse to identify these people. Budget Stewards cannot support their own project.
Should it be a specific DDIP?
Would add â& KPI for measuring itâs successâ to it, as weâll need some measure to use in order explore how to further improve the process.
Good one. Added.
What do we count as an onboarded member? Should they be constantly contributing, should they be active, should just go through the onboarding process?
True. I think having this definition should be part of the requirements for the onboarding process.
Feel like I misunderstood something, shouldnât requests for funding go to treasury guild? Would be grateful for clarification on what was meant here.
Yes, you are correct. Perhaps @Colin4ward can provide a better explanation of the goal here.
Currently the product project doesnât really function. Do we want the guild lead to âwake it up from the deadâ? If not, then should it be in the title?
The Product project and Design Guild overlap in this area. If the Product project is back, Design can collaborate with them. In any case, we need PMs input, and itâs important that an Operator works to deliver that to the DAO.
What were the considerations for the rewards sums? The fluctuate between each guild leader but it is not specified why.
Strategic importance for the DAO, time expected to be invested, and rough market value. This is a topic where I strongly urge everyone to provide more opinions so we can be more accurate, and fair for the operators and the DAO.
Thanks a lot for the feedback!
I can definitely help with this part.
Thanks, I guess that has to pass first? Budget Steward (nominates) > DAO Operator.
This is a lot to follow and put in perspective. Iâm surprised thereâs nothing like a standard DAO constitution generator. Would make things much easier and set expectations.
If you guys feel like the Budget Steward role is here to stay and should be assigned on the basis of seasonal $CODE rewards (would alter the character of coordinape circles), then I would say it needs its own DIP. Not sure if we even have a DIP that specifies that each season will have a dao-wide circle. âŚI think thatâs also a stepping stone if we are to allocate roles through it.
Itâs my general vibe that that specific part should pass through governance. But as things are, I donât see it being a problem anytime soon.
The idea behind this is that there would be a standard way for projects to give MBD the information they need to solicit funding from sponsors. Similar to the idea that projects could let the fundraising lead know that they are looking for grant funding.
That there is a need for a structured organization to drive this forward is clear. That said, would be good to clarify:
So this request is in case weâre trying to get a grant for a specific project? If yes, 100% makes sense!
If weâre talking seasonal sponsors, as far as I know they are not aware for purpose their money is going to go (as they are paying for content / marketing platform).
By what process will the position holders be identified? How does that become âpermissionlessâ and independdent? Otherwise, cabals controlling the DAO is possible (have seen it in many places). Ensure that the power vests in the members and not in any cabal/ politburo!
Yes. Thatâs one of the main goals, give the membership the power to vote on the operators. The nomination part is given to Budget Stewards, and all the DAO votes on those nominations.
If CODE is volatile, then convert CODE to USD equivalent. volatility in price cannot be the reason to change the number of CODE provided. This flexibility in the value of CODE is a given. Else, the treasury should simply convert CODE to $ and provide that as compensation. It has to be one or the other.
I think we should eventually move to giving all rewards in $CODE. But the main feedback we collected is that at this point, the rewards for operators should be mainly in USD, to avoid the problem we had with GTC.
There is a long list of cost items. What is the project revenue. Who drives it? How? Would be good to see a P&L and projections. What happens if the revenue falls short? Why should the cost lines not be aligned with revenue goals? If you fall short, you take a smaller variable compensation? So, I am saying that there should be a variable $ component in the compensation
IMO, This is the main pain point at the moment. How do we pay salaries if the revenues are not what we expected? We added a clause there, but perhaps is not enough. Strongly invite you to share ideas.
Your other point is also good. If the ops fails to deliver on KPIs, should we remove the $CODE incentives, for example? Half of it?
These are good questions. I would be really interested in adding specific suggestions to solve these issues. What do you think we can add?
Yes, for specific projects!
Iâm a strong supporter of better defining âpaid operatorsâ for the DAO and ensuring tighter scoping of responsibilities and accountability. One thing to note before I forget is they probably shouldnât be employeeâs, but independent services providers for the DAO. Might be worth updating language if this proposal goes ahead.
Quote a lot to unpack hereâŚ
First question, how do you see this playing with [DRAFT 2] Rewarding Contributions in $CODE?
In its current form it seems to supersede this proposal and its not clear to me how theyâd co-exist smoothly. Will try and bullet point concerns here:
It seems we have lots of competing approaches trying to address the challenges, I wonder how we can bring them together. My plan this week was the focus entirely on supporting teams to generate their budgets, but with all these unanswered questions not entirely clear to me how weâre doing this now.
My intention was for the budget proposal to define much of what is being defined here.
Maybe a synchronous could would be wise.?
How are Core Operators paid?
Their salary will be a base of USD amount, with $CODE incentives depending on achievement of KPIs. This proposal recommends valuing the positions in USD and then replacing 30% of that with $CODE equivalent.
Am i understanding this correctly whereby if X âpaid operatorâ is rewarding $10,000, $3,000 of that will be providing in $CODE at market rate? If thatâs the case, when does this proposal suggest that rate is decided⌠each month? start of the Season? End of the Season?
Furthermore, given the $CODE token could see significant market volatility, have you put any thought yet to the impact this may have on the treasury balance? A lot of $CODE is potentially being allocated here without any clarity on the impact it will have on available $CODE. We donât want $CODE going to 0 quickly, right?
Coordination Ops
Accountable for overall organizational process excellence, building internal coordination between guilds and projects.
Tasks to deliver for Season 1:
- Improve internal coordination and champion process improvements accordingly.
- Establish monthly cadence for town halls and DAO coordination meetings.
- Envisioning, definition and creation of Operations Guild for S1.
- Deliver plans to increase and encourage decentralization efforts in S2.
KPIs:
- Complete and maintain the legal background for Foundation.
- Complete and maintain the legal background for revenue-generating projects.
- Create an internal database of the membership.
Rewards:
- $8,000 monthly dollars, for one season.
Iâve got initial thoughts on an Operations Guild Budget here. At a very highly level itâs infrastructure, finance/legal/budget processes, DAO wide coordination. There is a lot of overlap which is nice to see but it seems like
It seems youâve opted for allocating finance to the Governance Guild so would be good to understand why youâre advocating for that and if youâve got any thoughts on what that might entail?
Why not a treasury guild that stands alone?
Community Guild Lead
Accountable for the overall engagement of members of the DAO.
Tasks to deliver for Season 1:
- Establish minimum viable contribution model for $CODE eligibility
- Deliver documented onboarding process & KPI for measuring itâs success
- Deliver plans to increase and encourage the diversity of the membership and leadership of the DAO in S2.
KPIs:
- Onboard 350 new members (>3/day)
- 100 documented minimum viable contributions
Like the goals here.
MBD Guild Lead
Accountable for increasing revenue with external relationships.
Tasks to deliver for Season 1:
- Develop a partnership pipeline with qualifying factors for paid and unpaid partnerships.
- Deliver S2 sponsorship package at end of S1
- Request for financial support template that enables initiatives to request funding solicitations
KPIs:
- $50k/month in S1 sponsorship
- 95% fulfillment on sponsorship obligations
Temporality and Rewards:
- $5,000 monthly dollars, for one season.
Seem like sensible tasks. The target for $50k sponsorship in Season 1 seems low though considering all the costs included in this proposal and then, as mentioned above, the thoughts on the last initiative leads call regarding $CODE rewards being a non-starter. If we only hit that number they I worry no one is going to be paid close to the amounts being suggested here.
I will update the financial model for the DAO with a scenario that includes these figures and see what weâre left with 
Gov and Treasury Guild Lead
Accountable for managing the strategy for $CODE
Tasks to deliver in Season 1:
- Develop a comprehensive treasury strategy, with a proposed $CODE burn rate, buyback schedule, and optional mint rate.
- Model 12 month DAO cash flow, updated once per quarter. Due by the second week of S1.
- Refine budget application and approval process.
- Guide discussion on $CODE delegation process.
KPIs:
- Final S1 treasury balance within 15% of proposal
- Define Delegation process (if any) by Snapshot vote.
Temporality and Rewards:
- $3000 monthly dollars, for one season.
This seems like of the highest impact set of tasks and goals but with the lowest reward, interested to understand why. Believe finance should sit with ops (at least for S1 as there are legal/Tax implications for the decisions that may be made. A lot the ground work for finances has already been done with the current ops team so feels like it would make sense for this to live there, with an aim to decentralised treasury management out (maybe to itâs own guild?) once weâre confident we understand the ins and outs of tax/finance/legal
Most of the rest of it seems relatively straight forward although taking a break and will look again. One important questions left, did you speak with any of the guilds re these changes beforehand?
Can these roles be performed but one person or shared out?
Both options can work. I will specify that.
What role do these people have in their perspective guild budget applications?
I would expect the elected persons to be highly involved in their guilds already.
Am i understanding this correctly whereby if X âpaid operatorâ is rewarding $10,000, $3,000 of that will be providing in $CODE at market rate? If thatâs the case, when does this proposal suggest that rate is decided⌠each month? start of the Season? End of the Season?
Good point. This isnât defined well. And neither the impact on the treasury.
I see the following possibilities:
It seems youâve opted for allocating finance to the Governance Guild so would be good to understand why youâre advocating for that and if youâve got any thoughts on what that might entail?
The reasoning is that they have been handling all the $CODE launch, and they are usually the reference when dealing with treasury issues. However, a stand alone treasury guild would work well in the future too.
This seems like of the highest impact set of tasks and goals but with the lowest reward, interested to understand why.
Yeah, perhaps we leaned too much on the expected hours invested. The roles and the amounts can/should be evaluated by budget stewards for the final proposal.
Most of the rest of it seems relatively straight forward although taking a break and will look again. One important questions left, did you speak with any of the guilds re these changes beforehand?
This proposal was discussed in the last initiative-leads call, and members of all guilds were present.
@Erik_Knobl thoughts on electing a Developer DAO board before choosing or finalizing DAO operators?
Can you specify what would be the concept behind this, and why it should be created before?
This proposal is responding to a need we have to deliver a concrete framework for our current operators with a contract that will finish this month.
thanks for the responses. my general feeling is this proposal and [DRAFT 2] Rewarding Contributions in $CODE need to come together into one succinct proposal and therefore process.