Edited to add detail toggles to certain sections to hopefully make the proposal easier to read and also copied out the NB at the top to. make it the first comment:
NB - This is daft. Any is hugely valuable and will help shape this draft over the coming days before moving it to a vote. Some of the included elements are still undetermined and highlighted by ALL_CAPS. There may also be elements missing that folks would like to suggest be added.
A list of those points and others that would be valuable to receive feedback on are:
The sunsetting of Guilds and Projects
Level of authority delegated to Stewards
The correct number of elected Stewards
How we calculate $CODE Rewards for Contributors that will also be paid in other assets
Any updates will be made to this proposal and highlighted in the comments. This section will be removed before elevating the proposal to a vote.
Contributor Agreement needs amended with appropriate dates
This may be a helpful initial, but may be limiting in the future.
If no vote takes place, the role falls on the previous Steward.
Discord stage with an audience? Allows audience questions or feedback in the same place as usual.
REQUIRES
Require this number to always be odd when combined with sub DAOs. Also may end up with sub DAOs out numbering main with a defined max cap. Would suggest min of 6, max of the bigger of the number of non elected members plus one and ten.
Sunsetting provisions for these should be required as well.
What happens if not?
What rights do we confer to sub-DAOs? What about informal ones? What requirements of contribution and profit are required?
I propose that we change this, as soon as weâre able to. Itâs not only confusing, but itâs actually pointless. Being a member of the DAO is tethered to accessing what the DAO provides. A lot of which, is situated within Discord.
I think defining this in laymanâs terms would also go a long way for people. This still sounds convoluted on the surface.
Can you elaborate on this, please? Who would nominate them?
Also, have potential conflicts of interest been considered with this approach? An immediate one that comes to mind, is the use of oneâs âStewardâ authority/access to elevate proposals that might benefit them self of their Sub-DAO, but may not necessarily be in the best interest of the broader scope of DAOâs members.
I remarked about this earlier last year in a Community Guild sync (when you were still leading Community & Ops as a single effort) â that itâs important that people always act in the best interest of the DAO; that their own profit should not come at the expense of the DAO (or its members); and that there should rightfully be proper guardrails to mitigate against that happening (where possible). My remarks were cautionary/preemptive at the time, based on some observations Iâd made over several months. Since then, weâve had the R*an revelations (which resulted in him stepping down as a contributor), and other instances which clearly show an abuse of authority and access.
So⌠food for thought.
Disclaimer: Iâm yet to read through the Contributor Agreement - so I appreciate if these guardrails have already been included in the language.
Does this mean the OKRs team is being shut down, and enveloped into this Stewards role?
Secondly, @vorcigernix has been instrumental to the OKRs development and philosophy. A lot of the ease with which weâll be working, from S2 onwards, is in large part due to his efforts in helping to re-define the OKRs framework. And even beyond just that - some of the earlier work and thesis that went into the discourse around restructuring the DAO, was based off of lengthy discussions we had in those OKRs meetings. The âState of Developer DAOâ thread in Discord is one notable example, but not the only one.
I say all that to say this:
What happens, if heâs unable to commit to all of the aforementioned responsibilities that are expected of Stewards (heâll need to confirm for himself). Heâll probably contest this, but without his work during S1, we would not have an OKRs framework that significantly reduces rigidity for teams, and subsequently helps to improve the budget review process. So if the OKRs Initiative is being enveloped into the Stewards role, then the DAO may potentially miss out - if there are time constraints on @vorcigernix end. And outside of myself, heâs the only other go-to person in the DAO (that I know of), on this subject matter.
Heâll need to confirm his own availability, relative to the aforementioned responsibilities; but I wanted to make this known.
Whatâs the rationale for a weekly meeting? Is that needed?
And how will this operate around the existence of the weekly Co-ordination call?
I prefer Discord, only because of the Craig bot. Usually, Google Meet is my preference. But we need to accurately record meetings in audio form.
Iâve also earmarked a role-gated section of the DD Labs server that will only be accessible to Stewards (see below):
These roles will be badge-gated by expiring badges (and thus, auto-assigned). This allows people to be easily rotated out, as these are term-based roles. It adds an additional layer of accountability as well, since the badges can be revoked.
Really great to see this picked back up. Is mmurthy still our point-of-contact, or is it someone else at Karma?
Iâve noticed that we currently have a total of 15 people listed as a Budget Steward. So for those of us who wish to remain in this role in S2, weâll be expected to put ourselves forward for election, correct? And all of us who are currently listed as âBudget Stewardsâ will be tasked with participating in that voting process?
Something that remains unclear to me, is how does the new structure limit/lessen the number of budget proposals?
I know restructuring Guilds as âPodsâ under DD Labs (Operational Layer), and then also restructuring Guilds as âHubsâ under Developer DAO (DAO Layer) will help to consolidate some S1 work-streams, and remove others. However, some of those work streams will remain. And some new ones will come to the fore, in the form of being a SubDAO.
Am I right to assume that each âPodâ and each qualifying SubDAO will still be able to obtain a budget allocation (if eligible and requested)? Or is something else being proposed, here?
As someone who has spoken and written about the SubDAO concept for a number of months, this wording is confusing even for me. And Iâd imagine that others who possess a fraction of my context (or none whatsoever) will have some difficulty fully grasping what this actually means.
The term itself will come up quite a bit over the course of the coming season, and it makes sense to have a 1 or 2-liner that is easy to digest. Particularly because, the existence of SubDAOs is a net-positive for the DAOâs ecosystem.
I know the term itself is elaborated as one reads further, but I think itâs massively important that non-contributors who may potentially create their own SubDAOâs are able to quickly understand what they are, without needing additional amounts of text.
My attempt:
âSubDAOs are entities that are created by Developer DAO members, which exist (in part) to advance the DAOâs overarching mission. They can be for-profit entities, public goods initiatives, or a hybrid of both. And being a derivative of the DAO, they are expected to return some value to it, thus feeding back into the ecosystem that they benefit from.â
Brevity isnât my strong suit, so the wording can definitely more concise â but you get me drift.
See my earlier comments/questions.
DevDao Women comes to mind, as does AxisOne.
Will the amount of available other assets be made known prior to start of each new season? So that both members and âcontributorsâ alike, are aware.
Loop me in when this discussion kicks off.
What about SubDAOs that are enveloped into the DAO Layer? DD Women and AxisOne, being two examples that I cited earlier. In its existing format, DD Women is essentially providing a service layer that feeds into the member UX. AxisOne is a public goods initiative that exists in service to the DAO.
Not to say that either SubDAO cannot evolve - but what if they choose to never be more? What happens?
In the OKRs work that @vorcigernix and I did during Season 1: we have proposed setting overarching goals (which in this context, should align with the DAOâs overarching goals), but do not set any KPIs. This will allow for that flexibility.
Happy to brainstorm around this, as it crosses into some of my Community-based focus areas. Particularly, how to ensure pathways between contributors and non-contributors are not blocked. Happy to adapt the 2min Rundown concept, but it canât run during TH.
Thank you @kempsterrrr for putting this together. It was a lot of work and it looks great on many fronts. Big kudos to you for that!
Here is my feedback:
Not rewarded directly for their role but provided opportunities to realise value for their Membership.
What is the value for members that have less than 400 $CODE?
As per the Foundationâs ByLaws , anyone with at least 1 $CODE token is a member of the DAO
Does this requirement comes from the ByLaws? I scammed through it and didnât see any part referring that people with at least 1 $CODE are members of the DAO. Agree with @luan here.
Voting power in Governance scales linearly based on the number of $CODE tokens held. For example, someone with 1 $CODE token has 1 vote, and another persona with 100 $CODE tokens has 100 votes.
If we have a governance token with profit incentives there are then two clashing usabilities of such a token. On the one hand you want more $CODE to have more to say in voting, but on the other you want to get rid of $CODE and transfer it into cash, so you can profit from it. Fundamentals of our token have two different incentives that clash with each other. Right now when the price of $CODE is not that high it is not a problem, but in the future valuable members of the DAO will be presented with a choice - do I liquidate my $CODE and get profit from it or do I want my voice to be heard with each voting. The DAO will loose good voting input from these people when they choose the 1st option. And they would still like to participate in the DAOâs governance, but their life situations might force them to liquidate. I know this is probably not a thing for S2, but for S3 letâs start thinking about either dual token model or reshape $CODE to be purely governmental and pay out people with stablecoins. For the health of the DAO in the long run I think that $CODE should eventually become a soul-bound token which can be get only through actions on DAOâs sake.
Where Contributors work for the Foundation directly or for a Sub-DAO that has yet to form a legal entity, they must sign a Contributor Agreement with the Foundation.
I still wonder what those legal entities of Sub-DAOs should be. Are we supposed to go with the law jurisdiction of the countries that the biggest number of Sub-DAOâs contributors come from? How much influence should D_D have over the nature of them? If there is a person who have a good Sub-DAO idea and skills, but lacks the law knowledge how can we help and guide such a person? Some more details with regards to those legal entities should be determined, as leaving them in Sub-DAOs decision might create a lot of chaos in the future.
Attend weekly Stewards Council (min 4/8 per season)
The same questions as from others. Does it need to be weekly? And what happens with DAO-wide Coordination Calls? I assume the latter is replaced by the Stewardâs meetings and that is the sole reasons for it to be a weekly meeting? It has more to do with the coordination between pods and hubs than with governance. I guess I would still be up for a weekly, but seems like maybe there is a dual purpose behind those meetings. I think that looking from the outside perspective of DAO members they might have a better experience if both coordination and governance is separated. Updates weekly on the statuses of the hubs and pods work is okay with me. Just seems like sometimes too much time from this meetings will be dedicated to governance and the coordination purpose will not be fulfilled and sometimes there will be too much to update on the governance and coordination part will be pushed back because of this.
The Stewards Council meets weekly on Thursdays @ 4 pm UTC.
âWill be conducted on a regular basis as decided by the Stewards Council. First meetings of season 2 will be conduced weekly on Thursdays @ 4 pm UTC.â
Meetings are restricted to the Stewards to ensure efficient decision-making and take place on DISOCRD_OR_ZOOM_OR_SOMETHING_ELSE.
I love DiSOCrd. It is better to keep as much on the Discord as possible and and minimize instances where the member needs to go somewhere else when he wants to do something with regards to the DAO. Also that would allow the meetings to be public, which I think is important. Some meetings that would require confidentiality can be arranged outside of Discord or in the channels created by @luan.
In this meeting template there are positions for actions after the raised topics. So should Stewards look into the agenda before the meeting, add proposed courses of action to every topic and then only facilitate and discuss on the meetings?
If no one is present on the call objects, their suggested course of action is recorded.
I donât fully understand this sentence. If there are not Stewards on the meeting, their suggested course of actions which was wrote by them in the agenda before the meeting is being act upon? Or does it refer to a single person not being present on a meeting?
Before the start of each Season, a min of 6 and a maximum of 10 Stewards are elected via DDIP .
Itâs probably a good idea to try make this number uneven if possible.
INSERT_USD_AMOUNT
Maybe instead of going with a fixed amount we can based this on the % from the profit recorded by the DAO in a previous season divided on the number of Stewards in the season? Like a 1-2%? If itâs in $CODE then that at this point in time probably doesnât matter that much (though take notice of what I wrote before), but any stablecoins or USD fixed amounts can sometimes burden the current DAOâs budget. To prevent Stewards from being remunerated too highly when the DAOâs situation is great we can put a fixed cap on how much that amount can reach f.e. the equivalent of $4000 USD per month or less. Still donât know how to look at this and what is âfairâ for a Stewards work.
Too many budget requests (19)
Itâs true that the new structure might not minimize the number of budget requests.
Have a multi-sig setup with at least 3 signers
Does this mean that a Sub-DAO should consists of at minimum 3 people or does it mean that other members from the DAO can be brought to the multi-sig, that are not part of the Sub-DAO?
The sunsetting of Guilds and Projects
This should always be communicated publicly through Discord and socialsâ announcements.
As we now have an off-season in January we didnât know how to approach founders that came to Fundraising Hub. Should we still offer them support and spend our time helping them, even though the DAO is âon pauseâ right now? Can we afford with our time availability to help everyone, even though our work now is not acknowledged by the DAO? I think these things should be announced much better in the future. The same goes with Town Halls. @luan just decided that they will be postponed and the announcements on this topic were unclear why (technical difficulties if I remember correctly). We should be more clear with the community on what we are doing. Right now only people present on DAO-wide calls have the full context.
Level of authority delegated to Stewards
Is there anything else outside of this proposal that should be assigned to Stewards?
How we calculate $CODE Rewards for Contributors that will also be paid in other assets
I was thinking of implementing a system based on the profits recorded by the DAO in a previous season. A % of those could be stated and every new season that number of funds can be allocated to contributors that work under the operational layer. Sub-DAOs can decide on their own systems. As mentioned with Stewards there can be a max cap and maybe even a min cap created. Donât know what % is appropriate though and I guess it depends highly of how much profits we make. We should make sure that DAO can exist for longer periods of time without good profits being made, so making a reserve that would allow the core DAO functions to be maintained for at least 2 seasons ahead seems wise. The next steps would be to determine which are the core roles in this approach.
What do you mean you? I originally had this down as fortnightly but increased to weekly at begin with think weâll need more time that not.
The idea is Stewardâs meeting replaces Coordination Call.
Good shout. Have added:
If no facilitator is chosen, it falls back to the last chosen facilitator.
Unsure about the stage and encouraging an Audience. Stewards are being empowered to do a job and doing that job might be harder under such a model. Gitcoin do a zoom call, record this and then upload it to YouTube. Happy with discord but donât think we should be driving attendance from Members and think it should be locked to Stewards (at least for speaking on the call).
@luan my view is Governance should remain in the main server, and Members should be encouraged to participate in Governance housed in a category called Govern/Governance. Donât see the use case for creating a Governance section in another server and worry that it would hide Governance from Members, which would be a bad thing.
I shared a flow chat in the Members dropdown above, which feels like a good high-level structure for things which Iâd love to review with you
From the ByLaws related to Tokenholders (could this be more specific?)
Tokenholders = Members (as defined this in this document)
âTokenholdersâ means the holders of the Tokens from time to time as evidenced by the Ethereum blockchain.
I agree that being a Tokenholders/Member or the DAO !== access to things in the DAO isnât ideal and we should work on this. Unsure if now is the time to make that change as unsure of what the implications in discord are. Maybe we can have this as a goal in S2?
Regarding the utility of $CODE. This model leans into $CODE being our Governance token alone. Members get their value from participating in the experience Contributors create. Contributors are empowered to create value from which they can pay themselves.
If Members want to get more value (i.e. not $CODE, or grant support etc.) from directly Contributing to the DAO they get a role with the Foundation, an existing Sub-DAO or start a new one.
Members shouldnât be selling their tokens unless they want to leave the DAO.
The big known unknown for me here, therefore, is âHow are we allocating $CODE under this modelâ
My thoughts are we should do that in two ways:
Members earn $CODE by participating in the DAO (i.e. we set a $CODE reward for attending workshops, writing a blog etc.). Ideally, this is done using an hourly rate in USD converted to $CODE at the time of proposal. (i.e. takes 15 hours to write a blog and the USD rate is $50/hour. Thus Member gets 50 X $CODE market price as a reward) thoughts?
Contributors are rewarded in $CODE based on an estimated % of their hourly contribution converted from USD. One possibility being Contributors receive 20% of their estimated time contribution to the DAO in $CODE using the same USD conversation as Members above.
To me, this detaches the idea of $CODE paying folkâs bills whilst still distributing Governance out to Members to decentralise the DAO.
Folks in the Sub-DAO would nominate them as part of their proposal which would go through DDIP and give members to chance to support/not support their nomination.
Added notes about handling conflicts in Simplifying DDIP proposal here. Is this enough? Might help to make it so you can elevate proposal youâve authored?
Regarding acting in the best interests of the DAO, I think that needs to be handled via Governance and the still yet to be updated Code of Conduct Process. What are your thoughts on the Stewards being the folks who handle CoC violations?
I think it should, yes. It always seemed strange having OKRs being set outside of the rest of the DAO-level decisions. If weâre empowering Stewards with strategy etc. my hypothesis is it makes sense they set the OKRs as well. Otherwise, how do we coordinate between the two?
The principles Iâd found myself working from recently were:
Member UX optimised for âPlayersâ of the game
Focus on 1 persona - web3 builders (Includes all types: Dev, Design, Product etc.)
Create a single experience for this persona
Objectives
Help folks Learn
Help folks build
Help folks grow their career
Yes, I think this is the right way to do this, so folks are chosen by the community.
Feelsbadamn anointing myself as a Steward given the foundation director role but I wasnât sure I saw another way around that given the required legal context that position brings. Iâd like not to be such a bus factor in the future and open a path for someone else to be the foundation director.
What do you think about this?
Primarily itâs by raising the bar a little for submission and requiring Stewards to handle conflicts/overlaps between proposals.
Hope we can explore this more when we speak later this week, but Iâm not personally thinking of Guilds > Pods/Hubs. The existing structure IMHO doesnât, and weâd be far better off greatly simplifying it from a Member experience point of view (i.e. channels > Categories for everything that needs a space) and then from a rewards standpoint, focusing on more meaningfully retaining individual people (or very small groups) to perform the bulk of work and then bountying out other things that make sense too). What seems to make sense is funding the following as part of the D_D Labs (just another sub-dao, ideally owned by the core contributors to itâs creation as directors)
Community Management
Operations
Partnerships & DevRel
Fundraising
Platform (Dev & Design for the website, grants platform if we do one etc.)
Jobs
Agree, and I like this a lot more. We should probably say entities or groups of contributors. thoughts?
This way, we can handle the Active (Foundation) status of Sub-DAOs.
Not sure what scope youâre thinking bout for Axis One but seems like it could just be the job of a Community Manager(s), rather than another Sub-DAO? At least in the short-term and if it grows turn it into something more.
Also very out of touch with D_D Womenâs latest thinking but just saw theyâre suggesting it be a social layer/networking space. Might be easier to speak over a call on this.
Lets brainstorm when we speak and in the DMs
Doesnât really matter. Should be a structure that best suits the aims and jurisdiction of the folks creating the Sub-DAO. Just an entity that provides a service to the DAO via a contract agreement with the Foundation.
The DAOs influence is voting them in as a Sub-DAO and keeping them accountable to what they promised (i.e. they wont get voted back in if they donât deliver and contract will be cancelled).
Think we can support folks in getting the right thing set-up but they should assume the legal responsibility for whatever they setup. Personally, I think this is a good idea for ensuring folks are serious about their work as well. Furthermore, part of this model is limiting what is in the scope of the DAO/Foundation so as the limit the legal risk or every other area of the DAO by one partâs actions. The other part is about allowing members to easily create value for themselves and the DAOs ecosystem.
more to reply to in various threads, will do so later. great discussions
Ultimately the term Sub-DAO is synonymous with Workstreams / Services providers etc. So if a group wanted to apply for funding for a specific initiative, thatâs fine, but it needs to come with more expectations in terms of accountability etc. and thus should result in an SLA with the Foundation.
Interested to hear more thoughts/critiques/ideas !!
Donât force it to be that time all the time. Wikist has a good replacement blurb in his message
This is gonna be a nightmare lol. I get paid >$70/hr while I know others get <$30 for very similar work elsewhere in the world. Choosing these numbers in usd may be problematic. Iâm happy to do it but be aware that each activity will need costs associated and verified. I think this will make the budget process a nightmare
IMO 19 budgets isnât bad if thereâs a group of people who will actually do the work.
Where there is a tied vote, the vote defaults to Against
This was after chatting with @ntindle that we need to handle this situation, and if there is not a consensus then defaulting to no is better than defaulting to yes
This needs definition, and should be strictly $CODE. I doubt we can afford any meaningful USD reward for 10+ people.
Other than that, I support the rest of the proposal.
Added an item to the agenda for the Coordination Call related to $CODE Rewards in S1 and how we calculate them (same model as last time or different)
This proposal currently pegs this role at 4 hours per week, so under the current model, that would mean (4 X 4 X 4 X 15) - 960 $CODE per month. How do you feel about that as a reward?
Iâm wondering if we either:
a) Keep $CODE Rewards the same
b) Increase the hourly rate for calculations
b) Decide on a USD rate and convert it via market price at the start of the Season/time of proposal
What are your thoughts on this?
(Iâm going to do some more thinking and will share back/bring to the Stewards meeting)
As per the discussion here, generally, this idea is supported, but there were concerns from @wolovim and @Erik_Knobl regarding the efficiency of all Stewardâs signing. The proposed answer is Community Elected Stewards (so min 6 and max 10) are the signers.
Being discussed here between @wolovim@luan & myself. It may be subject to further change.
Added more requirements for Sub-DAO proposals. I will further update this with a template today/tomorrow cc @nas@nassarhayat.eth
no reason just curious, does discourse have a feature to cap post length?
âŚgenuinely, thanks for the time and brain cycles. this is a dense, but thoughtful attempt to improve many core inefficiencies and ambiguities within how D_D operates. iâm supportive of the direction, but thereâs a good few details to work out still.
apologies up front: in order to get this review done by the promised date, i just reviewed the proposal itself and barely skimmed the comments. disregard my responses if you addressed them already.
thereâs a lot of meaty stuff buried in this steward drop-down. P-21 just passed snapshot and lowered the token threshold for the allowlist; this is a rapid follow-on that immediately chucks that out. that churn highlights the importance of @Erik_Knoblâs operating system document to keep the single source of up-to-date truth.
the steward role is a tall order. doubtful that many in todayâs budget steward role are aware. would suggest a session (dedicated or a chunk of time in next Coordination Sync call) to highlight this fact and help folks to digest the ask. futher, some of the objects are quite nebulous, e.g., âCoordinate activity between the Sub-DAOs.â
are steward council meetings a replacement or addition to the Coordination Sync calls? if replace, we need to address the needs of those who found value in the coordination calls, but wont in steward meetings. (is that just capturing contributor-style announcements somewhere else?)
what is meant by (min 4/8 per season)? still deciding on a number?
especially early on, i recognize its helpful for this group to sync up regularly, but shame (understatement) if a timezone-specific attendance requirement effectively rules out stewards from some regions. lets do what we gotta do to make S2 go, but would like to see broadening this a stated goal.
so 10 stewards are voted in each season plus 1-2 from each sub-dao? depending on how liberally the dao scales via sub-daos (and our definition of sub-dao), this number could get quite high. any cap?
sub-daos probably should have voice in stewardship of the dao, but just want to highlight this possible governance attack vector: sub-dao needs vetting from stewards to formally exist, but once active, sub-daos can operationally do as they please, including nominating stewards. (correct?)
consider: sub-dao steward nominee requires sharing the same template info (handles, address, intention, qualifications), then a confirmation step by the other appointed stewards?
this sub-dao purgatory needs definition. the âinformalâ title seems to imply that those pending sub-daos have some kind of status or ability. do they? if not, suggestion to rename the stage to âdraftâ or similar.
I know weâve already caught up last week, but wanted to respond here as well and say I agree with your perspective.
I agree. Iâm not sure if setting it as a S2 goal is needed. I think itâs something we can discuss during S2, but not hold ourselves to. The next off-season feels better.
I donât like it, but I understanding that we donât have the luxury of time, relative to our governance processes to source and elect on a group to take on these responsibilities. Hopefully by the end of Month 1 of Season 2, weâll have a group in place.
That makes sense. Iâm aligned.
That makes sense. I think remaining cognisant of these factors, and continuing to be open about them is helpful, as we work towards improved processes and structures in the future.
Gotcha.
I believe I clarified my thoughts in our meetings last week - but for those unaware:
DD Labs is the Operational Layer.
Developer DAO is the DAO Layer.
Pods/workgroups under DD Labs, and âHubsâ within the Developer DAO context (i.e. server) are essentially semantics by a certain point. The alignment between Kemp and myself is that:
Guilds are being abolished
Weâre prioritizing the non-contributor member experience (see image below for ref.)
A compensation structure is being put in place to tangibly pay people for work done under DD Labs
âSubDAOs are entities or groups of contributors that are created by Developer DAO membersâŚâ
In its immediate state, yes itâs being handled by myself. Long term however, itâs a SubDAO - and so Iâm positioning it as such.
I believe I clarified things on our call last week - but Iâll tag you in the thread again, so itâs on your radar. You can then let me know if you have additional Qâs
Awesome
Iâd caution against this characterization, mainly because SubDAOs rely (in part) on the DAOâs (not unlimited) resources. I donât think service providers by default, should be considered as synonymous with SubDAOâs. I see a loophole potentially being exploited here.
Lol, Iâm sure itâs possible but feels like a bad idea.
fully support getting something in place that is required to be maintained, happy to take that on as part of the Operations role as it seems to fit the mould but donât want to step on @Erik_Knobl s toes?
Been trying to balance the input vs reward calculation for this role as the current hourly rate doesnât seem suitable for a role with such importance, and weâre also lacking in meaningful treasury funds outside of $CODE to directly reward such a large group beyond what theyâre already being rewarded.
I think something similar to how Gitcoin defines their Stewardâs rewards would make sense as it balances the rewards for different types of Stewards based on what theyâre likely to be âearningâ from other roles in the DAO.
Compensation
GTC compensation will vary depending on the current relationship to Gitcoin
Existing full time Gitcoin contributors will receive a $200 stipend per month
Existing part time Gitcoin contributors will receive a $400 stipend per month
Non Gitcoin contributors will receive a $750 stipend per month
I believe we could then do something similar to for CoC Moderators if theyâre not going to be Stewards (FYI Gitcoin give this responsibility to Stewards). cc @luan
yes the idea is it replace the coordination call, which maybe is not ideal but didnât want to burden folks with yet another meeting if we could avoid it (which might be a fallacy). I see the weekly meetings as mostly about coordination unless there re active Governance proposals, operational things will be pushed to D_D Labs. interested to know more specific concerns if you can share them to see if we can improve this?
supposed to mean out of 8 sessions per person you attend a min of 4 (originally had this down as by-weekly. considering this is now weekly that would be a min of 8 out of 16. thoughts on this and also weekly vs bi-weekly?
this has been an on-going challenge in the DAO, as you say tough to address that now, maybe something you or another could Steward into reality in S2 ?
Very good point. Maybe we could amend this to min 6 max 10 Stewards elected from the community but then Sub-DAO reps need to attend the calls? This way their voice is heard even if they canât voteâŚ
Agreed the language here is not ideal. Will take another look at that and update here with any chances. Draft seems to make sense as matches our existing verbiage around proposals.
not a massive fan either. I thought weâd agreed we wouldnât do this and you were going to look into it? are you suggesting we do it and then replace it with a new groups once weâve figured out their elections and rewards?
Yeah, weâre aligned. Very keen to standardise our language though as more words === less understanding happy to jam on this.
yeah noted. feels like Workstreams == Sub-DAOs but Service Providers not so much. Thoughts?
But you pointed out that weâd still need 10 days, as per our DDIP processes. Further still, I donât yet have a full group of eligible names, who can put themselves forward for election. Only 1 has confirmed their intention. Iâm speaking to others, but nothing confirmed yet.
Sounds good. Weâll chat.
Yes, feels better. With the caveat that any work-stream seeking the âSubDAOâ classification, should meet the definition as laid out.
. It is better to keep as much on the Discord as possible and and minimize instances where the member needs to go somewhere else when he wants to do something with regards to the DAO. Also that would allow the meetings to be public, which I think is important. Some meetings that would require confidentiality can be arranged outside of Discord or in the channels created by 
for CoC Moderators if theyâre not going to be Stewards (FYI Gitcoin give this responsibility to Stewards). cc 
happy to jam on this.