The first word in DAO stands for decentralized and I think we need to perhaps review how things can be structured to be more permissionless. The centralization of appointments is a tad problematic because it confers hiring responsibilities on a small group, i.e. guilds leads/core team members/budget stewards
Any Budget Steward can trigger the process by making a DDIP in the forum stating the problem the new role would solve.
This problematic.
There can be two types of Operators: directly appointed by Budget Stewards, and Guild Leads, which each Guild can define in their Budget Applications for each season.
This is also problematic
The process should not start with a small group, it should be truly permissionless. DDIPs for Core Operators should be able to be initiatied by anyone in the DAO. I want to imagine the authors intent was to centralize the decision so that they can have some form of control from a budgeting perspective. My contention is the same rationale that will be used at the time, can be decoded, documented and made available to anyone so that anyone in the DAO can understand how to get a proposal passed and how not to. Core Operator DDIPs should include a clear budgetary component that details a clear rationale for whether or not the proposal meets muster. We have to move past the pressing need to centralize things especially at the core team / guild level.
A maximum three nominations can be made at the end of the process for the position, with a previous inquiry for availability and interest in the role. Each nomination can be of individual persons, and/or teams of maximum 3 persons.
Firstly, this is undemocratic. Secondly, how will this be enforced? How do nominees apply? Get shortlisted?
In my view, this should be permissionless as well, there should be no cap on the max no of nominees. It does open up a sybil resistance discussion and thatâs hard but thatâs part of what we can deal with moving forward but to put a cap is a bit of a cop out.
Also, seeing as this is a draft, Iâd suggest the removal of Coordination Operator and Fundraising Operator from this draft. We should simply focus on agreeing on the features of the CO-DDIP, have open discussions about HOW we want to structure them. Only after should we have CO-DDIP votes based on a role. We risk conflating the process with side discussions about specific roles in this present format.
The centralization of appointments is a tad problematic because it confers hiring responsibilities on a small group, i.e. guilds leads/core team members/budget stewards.
Agreed. Now, is the problem the process here, or the actual composition of the Budget Stewards?
I think that role is growing in importance, and we should draft a proposal. Would you be interested in work with me in that? Would that solve this point?
DDIPs for Core Operators should be able to be initiatied by anyone in the DAO.
Here is would challenge a little: Anyone? even newcomers without any knowledge of whatâs going on?
Agree we must define, and decentralize, but not like that.
We have to move past the pressing need to centralize things especially at the core team / guild level.
Yes. A first step would be to make the Stewards an elected, more open role.
Agreed. We can remove the cap. The initial goal was to increase competition for the role. It actually doesnât work like that anymore.
Secondly, how will this be enforced? How do nominees apply? Get shortlisted?
I would expect Stewards/Guilds to have open meetings for nominees to volunteer to take a position. We can suggest that, but guilds should be able to define and vote on that.
We risk conflating the process with side discussions about specific roles in this present format.
We have already had two of those discussions. And one of the agreements in the first one was to deliver a proposal, role definitions, and nominations for June 22. Discussion on the three topics will continue, though. Really interested in your pov.
Agreed. Now, is the problem the process here, or the actual composition of the Budget Stewards?
I think that role is growing in importance, and we should draft a proposal. Would you be interested in work with me in that? Would that solve this point?
Perhaps I need to phrase this differently. Budget Stewards will be responsible for deciding budget applications. My question is, how will these decisions be arrived at? There has to be a rationale that will be applied.
That decision making process needs to be codified so that everyone knows what the criteria is. If we donât do that, then we are leaving the decision making process entirely to the discretion of the stewards. This opens up room for vague decision making and a general lack of transparency. I donât mind it if this is what people want but we have to be clear that we are being deliberately vague about budget decision making and are leaving it up to the Budget Stewards to decide. And yes, I think the Budget Stewards role needs to be an elected post that should ideally precede this proposal if the intent is to vest that much power to the stewards.
Here is would challenge a little: Anyone? even newcomers without any knowledge of whatâs going on?
Agree we must define, and decentralize, but not like that.
100% like that. We can set up minimum $CODE reqs for those votes and ensure the language caters for pre-code and post-code realities. The CO-DDIP should define certain thresholds for an acceptable CO-DDIP. Things like a demonstrable need for that role, a minimum guild or DAO membership time of the proposer, community support for the role to be created and budget exists for the role, ensuring the authors canât be nominated for the same position, et al. It can be done without centralizing. Genuinely donât think an activated new contributor should be blocked from adding value. We have people who have joined late and done a lot of good work. Sybil resistance is a thing and it needs to be discussed, centralizing isnât the answer though.
That decision making process needs to be codified so that everyone knows what the criteria is. If we donât do that, then we are leaving the decision making process entirely to the discretion of the stewards. This opens up room for vague decision making and a general lack of transparency.
In my mind (and please challenge here), these are two different things:
We want transparency and know the arguments for the decision. I agree totally, and think we can ask for statements explaining them.
Defining a criteria previously. Here, again, I will challenge: Do we want to impose a criteria? or do we want all persons to be able the dao as they see fit (under the CoC)?.
Sybil resistance is a thing and it needs to be discussed, centralizing isnât the answer though.
Agreed. To comply with the mandate of the first Initiative Leads meeting, I would suggest to leave this proposal as it is, and start working openly in the definition of the Budget Stewards. I can make the announcement later in the day, and we can start right away.
For the record.
Though implying authority though their display on the governance forum, the role âBudget Stewardâ or âGovernance Stewardâ do not formally exist at this moment in time.
Thank you for pressing on the issue, you are totally right.
I have started an effort to define the role: Stewards - Google Docs
Would appreciate any comment/feedback on it.
(A maximum three: REMOVED) Nominations can be made BY ANYONE IN THE DAO at the end of the process for the position, with a previous inquiry for availability and interest in the role. Each nomination can be of individual persons, and/or teams of maximum 3 persons.
The 1st one feels very Governance focused and might make more sense to sit in their budget proposal.
The second feels quite focused on the onboarding effort in the community guild although there is definitely some cross-over regarding DAO tooling implementation.
Base salary will be $8,000 USD distributed in one Season, plus incentives up to 5,000 $CODE for the achievement of KPIs. (16.6% of the total for each KPI achieved), to be delivered at the end of the season.
How did we come to these numbers and do they apply to any core roles the guilds might decide on?
If they do, the total would be 8 * 8k = $64k - Iâm not sure weâll have the revenue to cover that + expenses, even if we can, weâll be running very close to the line. I will continue to update our finances so we can have a better idea of what weâll be working with at to the start of S1.
Establish a $CODE buyback mechanism.
Maybe add âin partnership with the Governance Guildâ cc @willblackburn
I suspect the main responsibility of this role regarding these tasks will be helping figure out what kind of % of the treasury we can be allocated to buying back tokens.
POC for legal representation in the Caymans (and anywhere else) and liaison between them and the DAO, and keep an open record of all processes.
The key thing here is POC. This role doesnât have cart Blanche to make the decisions here but I feel strongly it is sensible to have a single POC to streamline communication between parties. Others can and should be involved in decisions regarding our ongoing legal posture, with some sensible limits for example we canât have 100s of people on calls with lawyers.
Really interesting questions raised by @tonyolendo.eth and enjoying reading your discussions ( @tonyolendo.eth@Erik_Knobl ) on the topics. Broadly speaking I agree making the budget stewards role more democratic is a good aim but as suggested I do believe having some kind of level of contribution based gating on performing such a role should exist, and a least to being with that should be relatively high given the uncertainty we operating under as to how this will all play out.
A broad question⌠are we appointing representatives of the membership or delegates? What I mean is are we electing people and trusting them to make the right decisions or are we electing people and instructing them on what to do? Or where on that scale do we think roles such as these should sit?
My general thoughts are electing representatives with some guidelines/frameworks for decision-making is probably the right balance. I wonder if that can be achieved via other processes such as the Budget Application Process⌠here members need to justify the alignment with mission, values and goals, and financial implications, maybe these two areas should be the focus on how budget stewards and critique, accept and reject applications for a budget?
I agree. Governance and Community would work better for these. Any alternatives?
How did we come to these numbers and do they apply to any core roles the guilds might decide on?
There is no hard data to back them. Itâs in the range of what feels right. Would welcome any discussion on that. I would actually expect any other salary to be lower than this one.
Itâs in the range of what feels right. Would welcome any discussion
It feels low when compared to remote developer salaries and especially web3 developer compensation. We have access to many partners in the space employing staff, as well as public sources like levels.fyi and others.
We have to make a choice if Developer DAO is an employer that pay âthe least someone will acceptâ or in a competitive range. We have already seen many of our active members and leaders accept offers that these rates would not tempt them away from.
If we decide that working at Developer DAO is a âstarter jobâ in web3 that we expect to experience high turnover, there will be a cost to that churn.
We can also choose to structure D_D employment to consist mostly of part-time commitments.
Given our alignment towards building a better world, I would suggest that stable and competitive full time employment as a basis for D_D operations is most aligned. What do you think?
I would expect Stewards/Guilds to have open meetings for nominees to volunteer to take a position.
Are these meetings scheduled for the week following June 22nd?
Are we still doing this, given that the stewards are undefined?
I agree it is important to have a clear focus.
Operationally, the most important goals I see for our DAO are related to consistency and stability.
We will be able to achieve our myriad lofty goals much more easily once we have:
Stable and consistent operations and operational staff
Stable and consistent legal foundation and legal posture
Stable and consistent treasury, which means our own governance token
Stable and consistent governance
I kicked off the Public Goods Guild today to help us bring in large scale funding to sustain our treasury with stablecoins in addition to our own governance token once we launch it, but even that effort is a little out-of-sequence, as it will amount to very little without a stable legal foundation and the operational stability necessary to maintain it.
Do we value this kind of consistency and stability here? Structuring a process asking all our staff (and all compensated contributors in general) to have quarterly negotiations of their role and compensation will create a turbulent situation with a lot of uncertainty.
Are there any parts of Developer DAO that we want to create more stability and consistency within? Is it sensible for everything to be up for debate every season?
@RyanCoordinator makes some important points here regarding stability/consistency.
The original motivations for the DAO Operatorsâ proposal were two-fold as far as I understand it:
To clarify roles and responsibilities for retained/FT contributors so they can be held accountable, originally (and rightly) raised by @Colin4wardhere.
To make the process for identifying, selecting and holding these contributors accountable more open/fair
With the above clarifications in definitions of these roles, how would people feel about an updated Operations proposal that encompasses these role descriptions to address point 1 which can then be put to a DAO vote?
I donât believe this is necessarily the right long-term solution however given the realities of where we are and the timeline for refining this process and the unknown (potentially destabilising) impacts this may have on the Foundation/legal setup, believe a clarifying proposal regarding the scope and responsibilities of the Operations Team in its current form might be the right solution for the DAO to ensure the original aims can be fully delivered.
EDITED: Latests changes, as suggested by @tonyolendo, @kempsterrrr , @wolovim@MichelleBakels@RyanCoordinator
âRemoved the cap on nominations for the role.
âRemoved two KPIs from Coordination Operator that are better suited for Governance and Community Guilds.
âAdded âEach Budget Steward participating in the process is expected to make public their reasoning behind their votes and proposals.â
âFull Replacement of P-7: Formalizing our Developer DAO Operations Team
âRefined tasks for Budget Stewards, and added ability to remove Operator: âRemove Operator. At the instance of any member of the DAO, any Steward can trigger the process to analyze the removal of an Operator, and discuss the issue in an open meeting with the rest of the Budget Stewards, and have a majority vote. If the vote is in favor of the motion, the removal will be effective immediately.â
âSupport the creation of a Guild dedicated to support these efforts.
EDIT: * Base salary will be $8,000 USD monthly for one Season, plus incentives up to 5,000 $CODE for achievement of KPIs. (20% of the total for each KPI achieved), to be delivered at the end of the season.
RyanCoordinator and you have been leading up from the front. As much as DAOs are sparking innovation, they require a dedicated dev guild to reach operational effectiveness and cut through all the verbiage acting as an Extended Execution hand of Developer DAO.
How will it Work?
A team of 4-5 blockchain engineers, full stack developer, dev ops and financial analyst can be deployed on each proposal. This would be part of an Operation team in close collaboration with the DAO contributors.
-Weekly Sprint follow-ups
-Retainer model for X amount
-Contingent Compensation to be paid post development upon completion of each milestone and on meeting KPIs.
-One team under the same roof will facilitate operational efficiency and transparency.
-Contract to be done with a DAO.
-Contract to be revised ever Quarter.
Xord being a Leader is web 3 research and development in ZK Rollups, Ethereum and MEVs has founded Xord Solutions as blockchain consultation and development team working in the space since late 2018 and delivered over 43 projects in numerous domains from DeFi to GameFi to Layer 2 and now Infra level on EVM and Non EVM chains.
We want to empower Developer Dao and mantain speed of blockchain development.