May I ask how we arrived at the fundraising operator role being a priority and independent from the other guilds? Independent from mbd and the grants initiative in particular?
I fully expect this role to be deeply coordinated with MBD guild, and we have defined the tasks trying to define clear limits between the two parties. We could really help advise there.
As for Grants Team, it is a nascent initiative, and certainly can integrate to this efforts with this Op. The need and magnitude of the task of setting this, IMO, merits a paid role.
I am personally pretty keen to see more transparency on the fundraising side of things and would like it to sit within the grants initiatives. A team that is interested in this should be working to achieve these outcomes for the DAO and it should work very closely with MBD as their is a lot of overlap.
Totally. How can we improve this to advance those goals? Please help us improve it.
Other than the first KPI āLegal setting for at least one type of Grant application being accessible to DAO projects.ā I donāt see why this is a specialised role tbh.
Is there anything we need to add? How can we improve it?
I also donāt fully understand why this isnāt just an operations guild proposal. Why are DAO operators being treated as a special case?
That could have been a path to solve this issue too, but I donāt have clarity on Ops Team about the future of it, and also, on the strong need for it to be a Guild.
One of the motivations for this is time - the short term budget provision for full-time staff expires at the end of this month.
Defining roles within guilds has been an ongoing process for months - turning the ops team work into a guild and then setting up staff to work within a new guild structure is not trivial, and does not seem realistic that it could be completed with a ratified budget before the end of the month.
If we value the continuity of employment for our full time staff, we need something like this proposal, or else we need another short-term budget allocation like we had with P-9.
Yeah. Fair. Re paid role focused on raising grant funding for the DAO. I donāt see how this is different to guild roles tbh. Should have same level of accountability, transparency, and ability for others to contribute. Why canāt this role be on of the paid roles in the mbd guild? Similar to marketing lead role. Once both have scaled up to require own guild they can be spun out?
Iām mostly pushing back against any roles that have a special position across the dao.
Right. Iām keen for anyone that is currently being paid by the dao not to stop being paid because we canāt move fast enough to make a decision.
We should try structure roles and the dao based on what will allow us to operate in a productive and aligned manner. Think the work being done by initiative leads is getting us there and feels like weāre very close.
We should have a narrow proposal to extend existing contributor salary payments by a month if we canāt get things done in time.
Why canāt this role be on of the paid roles in the mbd guild? Similar to marketing lead role. Once both have scaled up to require own guild they can be spun out?
This makes a lot of sense to me, actually.
So, this proposal defines the process to define this type of roles. And the roles described are just suggestions. Deliberation is expected by Budget Stewards, and this point should be addressed and voted by them.
This can potentially sound a little ambiguous, so it may be good to offer a little clarity/context on what this means.
For example: within the Community Guild, Iāve begun encouraging us to be pedantic about focusing on a few core goals for Season 1 - in addition to starting small and scaling up gradually. And so I think that this approach should be stated in the proposal, as it offers everybody guardrails for how they contextualize the scope of responsibilities for Core positions.
Lofty goals are great and really where my baseline is; but clarity will help to facilitate focus. One example is the new Onboarding structure that is being built out - the backend of which, is pretty layered. And so here, I think of the Law of Conservation of Complexity: because as the person leading the Onboarding effort, I will primarily eat that complexity. Our new members will not. This will result in a seamless flow and UX.
But in order to translate this complexity to the wider Onboarding team and ultimately into our goals for the season, we need to re-frame it into a format that is digestible. Therefore for Season 1, what constitutes āonboardedā is split into two phases:
Passing through the new Onboarding process
Making 1 minimal viable contribution
The above is just one example of what will comprise our āfew core goalsā on the Onboarding Team. Ambitious goals that are small, attainable, and not too difficult to scale.
Adopting process that allow us to exist in the now, without sacrificing tomorrow, will be massively important as we look to organically grow this community.
I know @wolovim has been trying to encourage others throughout the DAO to focus on a small no. of core goals, per season.
This can potentially sound a little ambiguous, so it may be good to offer a little clarity/context on what this means.
I love being pedantic (kidding!).
Now, seriously, letās review each one:
āexpected to lead the DAO towards the achievement of the goals they have been hired to accomplishā
This is the main reason for hiring an operator, imo.
ācoordinating guildsā
This refers to the fact that most operators are actually Guild leads.
āprojects and individual members that may be needed.ā
You may have a point here. The idea is that operators are encouraged to include/recruit interested projects and members to deliver goals. What would you suggest?
After much thought on this, the right place for major fundraising and grants outside of MBDās commercial services sales should be a Public Goods Guild.
This will allow major PG funding, external grants, internal grants, and PG group coordination between major funding groups (Gitcoin, ENS, bitDAO, Public Goods DAOs and subgroups).
Iām holding a kickoff meeting for PGG next week.
I would suggest that we make the Fundraising Operatorās top-level goal the establishment and operation of a sustainable PGG that can carry out funding operations over the long term. This will allow for a stable long-term funding posture for the DAO.
I would add the delivery of a structured PGG budget with roles and a team to the S1 deliverables for the Fundraising Operator.
As a temperature check, does establishing a D_D PGG and bringing in funding for the DAO have general support here?
The first word in DAO stands for decentralized and I think we need to perhaps review how things can be structured to be more permissionless. The centralization of appointments is a tad problematic because it confers hiring responsibilities on a small group, i.e. guilds leads/core team members/budget stewards
Any Budget Steward can trigger the process by making a DDIP in the forum stating the problem the new role would solve.
This problematic.
There can be two types of Operators: directly appointed by Budget Stewards, and Guild Leads, which each Guild can define in their Budget Applications for each season.
This is also problematic
The process should not start with a small group, it should be truly permissionless. DDIPs for Core Operators should be able to be initiatied by anyone in the DAO. I want to imagine the authors intent was to centralize the decision so that they can have some form of control from a budgeting perspective. My contention is the same rationale that will be used at the time, can be decoded, documented and made available to anyone so that anyone in the DAO can understand how to get a proposal passed and how not to. Core Operator DDIPs should include a clear budgetary component that details a clear rationale for whether or not the proposal meets muster. We have to move past the pressing need to centralize things especially at the core team / guild level.
A maximum three nominations can be made at the end of the process for the position, with a previous inquiry for availability and interest in the role. Each nomination can be of individual persons, and/or teams of maximum 3 persons.
Firstly, this is undemocratic. Secondly, how will this be enforced? How do nominees apply? Get shortlisted?
In my view, this should be permissionless as well, there should be no cap on the max no of nominees. It does open up a sybil resistance discussion and thatās hard but thatās part of what we can deal with moving forward but to put a cap is a bit of a cop out.
Also, seeing as this is a draft, Iād suggest the removal of Coordination Operator and Fundraising Operator from this draft. We should simply focus on agreeing on the features of the CO-DDIP, have open discussions about HOW we want to structure them. Only after should we have CO-DDIP votes based on a role. We risk conflating the process with side discussions about specific roles in this present format.
The centralization of appointments is a tad problematic because it confers hiring responsibilities on a small group, i.e. guilds leads/core team members/budget stewards.
Agreed. Now, is the problem the process here, or the actual composition of the Budget Stewards?
I think that role is growing in importance, and we should draft a proposal. Would you be interested in work with me in that? Would that solve this point?
DDIPs for Core Operators should be able to be initiatied by anyone in the DAO.
Here is would challenge a little: Anyone? even newcomers without any knowledge of whatās going on?
Agree we must define, and decentralize, but not like that.
We have to move past the pressing need to centralize things especially at the core team / guild level.
Yes. A first step would be to make the Stewards an elected, more open role.
Agreed. We can remove the cap. The initial goal was to increase competition for the role. It actually doesnāt work like that anymore.
Secondly, how will this be enforced? How do nominees apply? Get shortlisted?
I would expect Stewards/Guilds to have open meetings for nominees to volunteer to take a position. We can suggest that, but guilds should be able to define and vote on that.
We risk conflating the process with side discussions about specific roles in this present format.
We have already had two of those discussions. And one of the agreements in the first one was to deliver a proposal, role definitions, and nominations for June 22. Discussion on the three topics will continue, though. Really interested in your pov.
Agreed. Now, is the problem the process here, or the actual composition of the Budget Stewards?
I think that role is growing in importance, and we should draft a proposal. Would you be interested in work with me in that? Would that solve this point?
Perhaps I need to phrase this differently. Budget Stewards will be responsible for deciding budget applications. My question is, how will these decisions be arrived at? There has to be a rationale that will be applied.
That decision making process needs to be codified so that everyone knows what the criteria is. If we donāt do that, then we are leaving the decision making process entirely to the discretion of the stewards. This opens up room for vague decision making and a general lack of transparency. I donāt mind it if this is what people want but we have to be clear that we are being deliberately vague about budget decision making and are leaving it up to the Budget Stewards to decide. And yes, I think the Budget Stewards role needs to be an elected post that should ideally precede this proposal if the intent is to vest that much power to the stewards.
Here is would challenge a little: Anyone? even newcomers without any knowledge of whatās going on?
Agree we must define, and decentralize, but not like that.
100% like that. We can set up minimum $CODE reqs for those votes and ensure the language caters for pre-code and post-code realities. The CO-DDIP should define certain thresholds for an acceptable CO-DDIP. Things like a demonstrable need for that role, a minimum guild or DAO membership time of the proposer, community support for the role to be created and budget exists for the role, ensuring the authors canāt be nominated for the same position, et al. It can be done without centralizing. Genuinely donāt think an activated new contributor should be blocked from adding value. We have people who have joined late and done a lot of good work. Sybil resistance is a thing and it needs to be discussed, centralizing isnāt the answer though.
That decision making process needs to be codified so that everyone knows what the criteria is. If we donāt do that, then we are leaving the decision making process entirely to the discretion of the stewards. This opens up room for vague decision making and a general lack of transparency.
In my mind (and please challenge here), these are two different things:
We want transparency and know the arguments for the decision. I agree totally, and think we can ask for statements explaining them.
Defining a criteria previously. Here, again, I will challenge: Do we want to impose a criteria? or do we want all persons to be able the dao as they see fit (under the CoC)?.
Sybil resistance is a thing and it needs to be discussed, centralizing isnāt the answer though.
Agreed. To comply with the mandate of the first Initiative Leads meeting, I would suggest to leave this proposal as it is, and start working openly in the definition of the Budget Stewards. I can make the announcement later in the day, and we can start right away.